Evaluating the war on drugs: US and Colombian interdiction efforts by Peña, Alfonso
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-03
Evaluating the war on drugs: US and Colombian
interdiction efforts
Peña, Alfonso










Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.





BS, Nueva Granada, 1982
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
from the
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for theis collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this
collection of information, including suggetions tor reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services. Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. 1215 Jefferson Davis
Highway. Suite 1204. Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington. DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank) 2. REPORT DATE
March, 1994
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
TITLE AND SUBTITLE










9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of teh author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the
US Government or the Colombian Ministry of Defense or Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT ( Maximum 200 words )
During the past decade, a great debate has arisen over the course of drug policy in the United States and in Colombia.
In both countries, there are many factors to be considered relating to the issue of drug abuse and narcotics trafficking.
There is also a variety of opinion about what to do to solve the problem.
This thesis examines the background and nature of cocaine-related activity in Colombia and the transport of cocaine to
the US for consumption. Additionally, it inquires into the ongoing efforts of agencies of both countries to enforce an
effective interdiction policy. Production, transport, and seizure issues and statistics are discussed, and there is an
analysis of the interdiction effort in terms of cost effectiveness and supply and demand. This work concludes that there
is a need for reexamination of the intent and execution of policy regarding drug trafficking, exhibited by the failure of
current policies based upon statistical evidence. Additionally, there is a recommendation for more partnership between
the governments and people of the US and Colombia in addressing the problem.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
COCAINE. CALL MEDELLIN, SMUGGLING. DRUG USE, INTERDICTION
16. PRICE CODE














20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UL
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)
Prescnbed by ANSI Sid. 239-18, 298-102
ABSTRACT
During the past decade, a great debate has arisen over the course of drug policy in
the United States and in Colombia. In both countries, there are many factors to be
considered relating to the issue of drug abuse and narcotics trafficking. There is also a
variety of opinion about what to do to solve the problem.
This thesis examines the background and nature of cocaine-related activity in
Colombia and the transport of cocaine to the US for consumption. Additionally, it
inquires into the ongoing efforts of agencies of both countries to enforce an effective
interdiction policy. Production, transport, and seizure issues and statistics are discussed,
and there is an analysis of the interdiction effort in terms of cost effectiveness and supply
and demand. This work concludes that there is a need for reexamination of the intent and
execution of policy regarding drug trafficking, exhibited by the failure of current policies
based upon statistical evidence. Additionally, there is a recommendation for more






II. THE ENEMY 4
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4










d. Where Money Laundering is Vulnerable 24
C. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 26
1
.
Structure and Organization 26
IV
M^L,EI KNOXLIBRARY
2. The Nature of the Business 29
3. The Physical Assets 30
4. The Human Assets 32
5. The Domestic Market 34
6. Industry Developments 34
D. IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 37




2. Economic : 46
3. Domestic Drug Use 47
4. Environmental 47
III. THE ALLIES 49
A. UNITED STATES 49
1
. Organizations 49
a. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 51
b. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 52
c. U.S. Customs Service 53
d. Department of Defense 55






a. The National Council of Narcotics (CNE) 60
b. Armed Forces 62
c. The National Army 63
d. The National Navy 63
e. The Colombian Air Force 64
f. The National Police 65
g. The Department of Security Administration (DAS) 67
h. The Customs Service 67
i. The Narcotics Police 68
2. Funding 70
C. U.S.-COLOMBIAN COOPERATION 73
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION EFFORTS 79
VI
A. OBJECTIVES 79
B. ESTIMATING QUANTITY 81
1
.
The Maximum Estimate 81
2. Eradication 84
3. Seizures 85
a. Paste in Colombia 85
b. Colombian Laboratory Destruction 87
c. Cocaine in Colombia 88
d. Cocaine Enroute to the US 90
4. World-Wide Cocaine Seizures 91
5. Estimates of Colombian Exports, Considering Losses 93
C. INFORMATION ON PRICE 97




2. Objectives Involving Demand and Supply 106
a. Supply Increases 106
b. Possible Explanations 107
vn
3. Indications of Consumption 113
4. Summary 118
E. INCREASED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT 118
1. Costs 118
2. Benefits 119
3. The Danger 120
a. U.S 120
b. Colombia 120
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 122
BIBLIOGRAPHY 128
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 131
Vlll
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1 . STEPS IN COCAINE PRODUCTION 11
FIGURE 2. NARCOTICS TRANSPORT ROUTES 14
FIGURE 3. PLACEMENT OF CASH IN THE SYSTEM THROUGH
NON-TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 17
FIGURE 4. PLACEMENT OF CASH VIA STRUCTURING 18
FIGURE 5. CONVERSION OF CASH TO MONETARY INSTRUMENTS
FOR TRANSPORT 19
FIGURE 6. TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY WIRE 19
FIGURE 7. MONEY LAUNDERING THROUGH CHECK CASHING 20
FIGURE 8. ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL DRUG
ENFORCEMENT POLICY BOARD 50
FIGURE 9. COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE COLOMBIAN
SECURITY FORCES (1992) 60
FIGURE 10. COLOMBIAN ANTI-NARCOTICS POLICE
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 69
IX
FIGURE 11. INTENDED EFFECT OF INTERDICTION ON QUANTITIY
AND PRICE 80
FIGURE 12. NNICC MAXIMUM ESTIMATES FOR COCAINE
PRODUCTION, 1981-1988 83
FIGURE 13. ERADICATED COCA-PRODUCING HECTARES IN
COLOMBIA 85
FIGURE 14. COCA PASTE SEIZURES IN COLOMBIA, 1984-1992
( 1 METRIC TON=l ,000 KILOGRAMS) 86
FIGURE 15. COLOMBIAN LABORATORIES DESTROYED, 1981-1992 88
FIGURE 16. COLOMBIAN COCAINE SEIZURES, 1981-1992 89
FIGURE 17. SEIZURES OF COCAINE BY US CUSTOMS AND COAST
GUARD 91
FIGURE 18. WORLD-WIDE COCAINE SEIZURES, 1947-1985 92
FIGURE 19. COMPARISON OF NNICC AND ARRIETA ESTIMATES 96
FIGURE 20. US WHOLESALE PRICE OF COCAINE PER KILOGRAM 98
FIGURE 21. US INTERDICTION BUDGET VERSUS COCAINE
PRODUCTION 99
FIGURE 22. COCAINE PRODUCTION VERSUS US SEIZURES 100
FIGURE 23. COLOMBIAN DEFENSE BUDGET VERSUS COCAINE
PRODUCTION 102
FIGURE 24. US INTERDICTION BUDGET VERSUS PRICE 102
FIGURE 25. POTENTIAL REVENUE PER HECTARE (USING
WHOLESALE PRICE) 104
FIGURE 26. US INTERDICTION COST PER KILOGRAM SEIZED 104
FIGURE 27. US INTERDICTION COST PER CULTIVATED HECTARE. ... 105
FIGURE 28. SUPPLY AND DEMAND CURVES SHOWING EFFECT OF
INCREASED SUPPLY 107
FIGURE 29. PRICE AND QUANTITY, FROM PRODUCER TO
CONSUMER Ill
FIGURE 30. RANGE OF SHIFTS IN SUPPLY AND DEMAND CURVES,
GIVEN A DECREASE IN PRICE 113
FIGURE 3 1 . THREE STUDY COMPARISON OF COCAINE USAGE 114





Since the US declaration of the "War on Drugs" during the 1980's, the people of the
United States have looked out beyond their shores and land borders for the solution to the
drug problem. With more and more funds devoted each year to interdiction efforts aimed
at preventing, or at least reducing the amount of, drugs reaching the US consumer, the
primary goal of anti-drug policy has been to intercept supply, rather than reduce demand.
The efforts of the Colombian government against narcotics traffickers have, due to
the nature of Colombian drug involvement, centered around the elimination of supply,
and the equipment and personnel networks necessary to maintain it. This is the result of
the practical issues at work in and around the drug problem, rather than the outcome of a
political or law enforcement strategy.
There is, it seems, nothing to be gained by an adversarial relationship between a
supplier and consumer country. The view that a supplier country is contributing to the
social deterioration of a consumer country may be a de facto truth, but it ignores the
responsibility which must be taken by a nation for the actions of even a small percentage
of its people. Similarly, the people of a supplier country cannot view the concerns, and in
some cases demands, of a consumer nation as arrogant or petty when the societal impacts
made upon the consumer country are of the severity evidenced by the familiar statistics
on drug related crime and violence.
It seems prudent, therefore, to make an examination of the history and elements
involved in what is commonly known as the "drug problem," so that both the leadership
and people of the nations involved can make determinations as to what action to take, as
well as the probability for success that any action may have. In a small way, this work
will attempt such an examination.
It should be noted from the first that the ideas and opinions which are expressed in
this thesis are entirely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the institution
through which the work is presented or the governments or any agencies of the United
States or Colombia. Where the views expressed may be deemed insightful, it is almost
certain that they are not new; where they are found to be simplistic or lacking, the author
expresses his hope that such shortcomings will be forgiven. In any event, it must be
stressed that the entirety of the present work is intended as a beginning, rather than an
end; a question rather than an answer.
In examining the "War on Drugs," there are several questions to be answered. Who
is the enemy and who are the allies? What are the strategies employed by both? What
are the current trends in production, interdiction, and consumption? Finally, what are the
prospects for victory; is the war being won or lost? The primary research objective of
this work is to determine the effectiveness of the interdiction strategy being employed in
the War on Drugs by consulting the indications of the trends noted above.
Chapter II, "The Enemy," discusses the Colombian cocaine trade. After an
overview of the history of narcotics trafficking in Colombia, the activity itself is
examined. Four key areas are investigated: production, transportation, distribution, and
money laundering. As further background on the issue, the next section examines
industrial organization issues. A following section describes the economic impact of the
profits which are derived from the activity. Chapter II concludes with a discussion of the
effects of narcotics trafficking on Colombian society.
Chapter III, "The Allies," concerns efforts in the US and Colombia aimed against
narcotics trafficking. In the case of each country, the primary agencies and their roles are
listed, and there is also a discussion of the funding provided for those agencies over
recent years.
Chapter IV provides an analysis of the key research question. It analyzes the
effectiveness of the efforts outlined in Chapter III against the narcotics activity outlined
in Chapter II. This chapter includes information on production, seizures, prices, and
consumption, as well as a discussion of the role of supply and demand in the cocaine
trade and an analysis of the cost effectiveness of interdiction efforts.
Chapter V offers conclusions and recommendations.
II. THE ENEMY
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the 1980s, Colombia achieved international notoriety as a major narcotics
trafficking center. The country's involvement with drugs begins earlier in its history. As
in Bolivia and Peru, although on a smaller scale, Colombia's indigenous populations had
grown and chewed coca leaves for thousands of years. Marijuana cultivation, by contrast,
is a much more recent phenomenon. It arrived in Colombia along the Caribbean coast via
Panama during the first decade of the twentieth century. By the 1930's, limited
cultivation began among the costeno^ population centered on Barranquilla, where the
urban criminal element was known for smoking marijuana. During World War II,
experiments with hemp cultivation designed to increase fiber production for the war
effort substantially expanded the growth of marijuana.
The real takeoff in Colombian marijuana production began in the middle and late
1960's as result of the growing demand generated by the market in the US. 2 By the early
1970's, Colombia was a major supplier of marijuana to the US market, although most of
the market remained in the hands of Mexican traffickers. 3 When, in the early 1970's, the
US tightened drug enforcement along the border with Mexico and the Mexican
government launched a major effort against its domestic producers, the epicenter of
A mixed-ethnic population inhabiting Colombia' s coastal areas.
Colombia: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
ibid.
marijuana production in the hemisphere rapidly shifted to Colombia, especially to the
Guajira Peninsula and the slopes of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Martha. By the end of the
decade, Colombia accounted for about 70 percent of the marijuana reaching the US from
abroad. Between 30,000 and 50,000 small farmers on Colombia's Caribbean coast came
to depend directly on marijuana cultivation for their livelihood4 , while at least another
50,000 Colombians, including seasonal pickers, guards, and bankers, were included
among the financial beneficiaries of marijuana production and distribution.
The drug trade came to be an important source of new wealth for the Caribbean
coast, providing the population with income, comforts and a degree of economic stability
that they had never before enjoyed. The Caribbean port cities of Barranquilla, Santa
Martha, and Rio Hacha, in particular experienced unprecedented prosperity. At the same
time, however, the Guajira Peninsula experienced a dramatic upsurge in drug related
violence, and a simultaneous disintegration of local police and judicial institutions as the
result of corruption and bribery. Local food production declined as thousands of hectares
of farming land were converted to marijuana cultivation. Farmers who had traditionally
grown crops such as bananas were now considering marijuana, and those who did not
found labor more expensive and in short supply. Inflation was rampant, especially in
land markets, as drug producers increased bids for property. Many legitimate businesses,
including banks, hotels, airlines, restaurants, and casinos, were bought up by individuals
who had profited in the drug trade, and these ventures came to be used for "laundering"
funds which had been illegally obtained,
ibid.
The Colombian cocaine trade paralleled that in marijuana. In the late 1960's, a
relatively small cocaine smuggling network, largely under the control of an exiled Cuban
criminal organization based in Miami, 5 began to emerge. Coca was cultivated on small
plots by paez Indians6 in the San Jorge Valley, which is in the Department of Cauca in
southwestern Colombia, and in the cordillera occidental. Smuggling was carried out
largely by individual carriers, or "mules" 7 , who transported a few kilograms at a time
using commercial airlines.
In the early 1 970's, as demand for cocaine expanded rapidly in the US, the limited
raw coca supplies produced in Colombia were augmented with coca paste imported from
Bolivia and Peru, refined in "kitchen laboratories" in Colombia, and smuggled into the
US. The 1973 Chilean military coup that deposed President Salvador Allende also
proved to be a severe blow to the Chilean criminal gangs involved in the cocaine trade in
that country. When the military government of General Augusto Pinochet clamped down
on drug producers, many Chilean "chemists" fled Chile and ended up swelling the ranks
of the refining networks in Colombia and Miami. In addition, two Colombians, Carlos
Lehder and Jorge Luis Ochoa, worked with criminal networks in the city of Medellin in
the mid- 1 970's to transform the cocaine transportation system from smaller mule
activities into huge airlift operations. 8
ibid.
The Paez are a particular group of Indians who live in the south of Colombia and who have
a distinct and separate language, culture, etc.
The name for persons that are transporting cocaine from one location to another.
General Command of Colombian Military Forces.
By late 1977, the United States drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had
opened a file under the name "Medellin Trafficking Syndicate". Violence was an integral
part of the operations of the Medellin Syndicate from its very beginning. As the
organization grew in size, power, and wealth, it also became more violent and more
ruthless. After consolidating their dominance in South America, the Medellin drug
bosses in 1978 and 1979 turned their attention to controlling wholesale distribution in the
US. Thus began a period of violence in southern Florida known as the "Cocaine Wars". 9
As the violent struggle for US market domination subsided in late 1981 and
afterward, what emerged was a loosely organized criminal enterprise known as the
Medellin Cartel. In effect, by installing their own middlemen in the US, the Colombians
"forward integrated" their operations and were thus able to capture additional profits. By
reinvesting their profits in the existing operation they were able to expand and streamline
production in Colombia and farther south in the Andes. They also purchased bigger and
better airplanes and boats for transporting drugs, more sophisticated electronic
communications devices and radar to escape detection, and paid huge sums in the form of
bribes for protection to law enforcement in Colombia, the US and elsewhere. 10
By the early 1980's, marijuana traffic was already being eclipsed by the cocaine
trade, both in terms of wealth and the power associated with it. Cocaine also generated
criminal organizations that were more profitable, more vertically integrated, more
ibid.
Intelligence Appreciation, Colombian Army, 1985.
hierarchical in structure, and more ruthless in their systematic use of bribery,
intimidation, and assassination than the marijuana traffickers had been.
Although Colombia had long been accustomed to extraordinarily high levels of
violence, the rise of the cocaine industry provoked a qualitative change. Relying on paid
assassins, locally known as sicarios" Colombia's drug lords fought not only among
themselves but also launched a systematic campaign of murder and intimidation against
Colombia's government authorities who could not be bribed. This enabled an effective
circumvention of the country's justice system, and in the process drove scores of
Colombians from all walks of life into self-imposed exile. Drug trafficking contributed
significantly to the devaluation of life throughout Colombia, and converted murder and
brutality into a regular source of income for individuals with an inclination for it.
Unlike marijuana money, which was concentrated along the Caribbean coast,
cocaine money made its way into major metropolitan areas, most notably Medellin, Cali,
and, to a lesser extent, Bogota.
Cocaine trafficking is a highly specialized business; the organizations that handle
cocaine do not overlap much with those that handle South America's other major drug
export, marijuana. In Colombia the largest producer of both drugs-the cocaine and
marijuana business display distinct hierarchies, assets, employees, and methods of
operation. They have different regional bases: the main centers of refined cocaine
production appear to be in Antioquia, Cordoba, and the Middle Magdalena Valley. Coca
grows predominantly in the southern departments of Meta, Guaviare, Vaupes, and
Assassins for hire.
Caqueta. The centers of the marijuana industry are in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta
and the Serrania de Perija mountains in the northeastern part of the country (The Sierra
Nevada de Santa Marta also contains some coca cultivation). Trafficking patterns are
also different: the vast majority of cocaine smuggled into the United States is shipped by
air (the majority by general aviation aircraft). Most Colombian marijuana, on the other
hand, enters the United Stated by sea, often in stages. "Mother ships" may carry the cargo
most of the way, then discharge it to smaller, faster craft that make the final run into the
United Stated, particularly along the Florida coast. 12 Cocaine traffickers regard marijuana
as not particularly lucrative; moreover, they hold marijuana dealers in low esteem, seeing
them as uncouth peasants with little intelligence or entrepreneurial talent.
The cartel leaders began to develop an appreciation for the utility of political power
as well. Several, such as Lehder, bought interests in local radio stations and newspapers.
Others, as in the case of Pablo Escobar, sought to establish themselves as patrones
(patrons) in the cities by giving money to the poor, building low income housing in the
slums, or purchasing popular sports teams and constructing sports stadiums. This was a
particularly efficient method of operation, considering the great potential that existed for
money laundering in each situation. All of the cartels regularly contributed to political
campaigns. Lehder went so far as to create his own Latino Nationalist Party 13 and to
publicize it through his newspaper, Quindio Libre. In 1982, Escobar was actually elected
Colombian Antinarcotic Police.
A combination of Colombian and Latin America nationalism, leavened with elements of
fascism.
as an alternate congressman on a liberal party slate in his native Department of
Antioquia.
14
Recently, officials have begun to review the activities of the Colombian cartels in
light of the death of Pablo Escobar, killed while trying to flee from Colombian
authorities. While official efforts were aimed at smashing the Medillin cartel, the Cali
cartel maneuvered effectively to capture market share. The Cali cartel is now estimated
to control 80% of the drugs flowing into the United States, taking advantage of the
reduced role of the Medillin cartel. 15 This latest evolution promises more difficulties in
dealing with the drug problem, as the Cali cartel has a reputation for good business and
no violence.
B. THE STRUCTURE OF NARCOTICS ACTIVITY
The method by which cocaine moves from cultivation to the ultimate consumer can
be divided into three phases: Production, transportation, and distribution. Colombian
trafficking organizations dominate the higher value-added stages of the narcotics-logistic
chain: refining, smuggling, and wholesaling. The flow of drugs from production to
. nsumption is illustrated in Figure 1
.
History of the Colombian Congress.
"Cali High: Colombia", The Economist, December 25, 1993, v329, n7843.
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\ Leaves are Processed into Paste
U
J
Paste is Transported to Labs Precursor Chemicals are Obtained
Paste Processed into Base
^ iBase Processed into Cocainel
Cocaine Packaged and Labelled
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> Cocaine Transported to US
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c Drug Proceeds Collected
Figure 1. Steps in Cocaine Production. Source: Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police.
1. Production
The story of cocaine begins at or near the farm site. Middlemen acting for
traffickers pick up coca leaves from the farmer and transport them to nearby laboratories.
Sometimes leaves are conveyed on the backs of hired laborers, who travel down hidden
jungle trails to avoid detection by the authorities. A few of the larger coca growers have
developed forward linkages into the production of paste and maintain clandestine
laboratories on their farms. Similar to the transport of leaves, paste production is labor
11
intensive. Laboratory owners hire so-called pisadores, literally "tramplers", to stomp on
the leaves before they are immersed in the kerosene solution, because crushing expedites
the process of leaching out the cocaine.
An obviously high level of integration exists between paste manufacture and
coca cultivation. Coca growers, laborers hired to pick leaves at harvest time, illicit
wholesalers, leaf carriers, laboratory owners, and pisadores all constitute more or less a
single socioeconomic unit. Differentiation does occur, however, at the more advanced
stages of cocaine manufacture. Converting base to hydrochloride tends to occur far from
the farm site. Most Colombian CHCL laboratories, at least in recent years, have been
located outside of coca-growing areas; for example, in ranches in the departments of
Antioquia and Cordoba or deep in jungles along the Colombian-Brazil-Peru border. (One
reason for such laboratory siting is that the traffickers do not like dealing with the FARC,
an insurgent group which controls many zones of coca cultivation.) 16
Moreover, cocaine production is "spread out" by country. Following the general
pattern, Peru and Bolivia supply semiprocessed cocaine to the Colombians for refining
and subsequent export to the United States. For example, most of Peru's cocaine exports
take the form of cocaine base (produced in the Upper Huallaga Valley or in the Peruvian
Amazon), which is sold to Colombian buyers. Bolivia's cocaine industry is somewhat
more developed than Peru's. Colombians also purchase much of Bolivia's CHCL
production, which they then smuggle to Colombian wholesalers in the United States.
Colombian Army Intelligence.
12
The US National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers' Committee (NNICC), the
federal coordinating committee for drug matters, estimates that 75 percent of the cocaine
entering the United States in 1985 and 1986 was refined in Colombia. Colombian
syndicates dominate both cocaine smuggling to the United States. (In the 1970s, the
Colombians grabbed control of the wholesale traffic from Cuban Americans and from the
traditional US Mafia) 17 The Colombians' role diminishes as the drug moves through the
wholesale and retail distribution network yet their dominance at the upper levels of this
network enables Colombian dealers to capture some of the huge profits to be made by
selling to the US. market.
2. Transportation
Colombia's cocaine syndicates also draw on that country's long tradition of
smuggling. In fact, the so-called Medellin syndicates evolved largely from families of
contrabandistas that used to ply their trade in and out of the Gulf of Uraba, on
Colombia's Caribbean coast. Colombia's criminal syndicates are noted for their business
acumen and also for their ruthlessness.
Figure 2 illustrates the principal routes for smugglers operating between South
America and the US.






Figure 2. Narcotics Transport Routes.
Source: DEA Quarterly Intelligence Trends Vol. 13 No. 1, 1993.
3. Distribution
The final stage of the cycle is the distributions of narcotics in the USA. By and
large, Colombian control the distribution system in the US at the wholesale level. Each
cartel group within Colombia has "managers" in the United States who oversee
distribution of cocaine and collection of money for a particular area of the US. Each
manager may oversee several distribution networks, with each network organized by the
manager's designee.
One such network, which was dismantled in Los Aiigeles by the FBI, was run by
a Colombian who worked for the Cali Cartel. This Colombian controlled a cell of 12
14
other Colombians and this cell was one of 25 which involved this particular distribution
network. Several law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles estimated that there are
approximately 4,000 Colombians in the Los Angeles area engaged in distribution of
cocaine.
18
At the lower levels, task become more compartmentalized and specialized. In
Los Angeles, New York and Miami, persons were flown to US from Colombia solely for
the purposes of serving as "stash" house keepers or couriers. These low level workers are
referred to as "mopes" by US law officials because they know very little about the
organizations beyond the name and phone number of their immediate supervisor. Family
members of operatives in the US are often kept in Colombia to ensure that they stay in
line.
Regardless of their function most Colombians working distribution networks
maintain close telephone contact with their employers in Colombia. Part of the profile
developed in one jurisdiction to identify suspects included the deposit of seven quarters
in a pay telephone, which was the amount necessary to call Colombia constantly to
discuss the inventory of cocaine loads received .
The successful dealer is one with a reliable source of large amounts of drugs,
perhaps with some backup sources for periods of drought, and several reliable outlets.
The day to day business of dealers at the middle stages of the distribution networks, that
is, dealers who buy from an importer and sell to others wholesalers or retailers, consists
largely of dunning costumers for timely repayment of their short term loans in order to
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearings, September, 1989.
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have cash ready to repay the supplier for one's short term loans, so that next week or next
month drugs will be delivered and the whole process can continue.
For all these reasons, Colombians have a stranglehold on the US. cocaine
market. The best opportunity for the other Andean countries (especially Bolivia, because
of geography) is to market refined cocaine in the West European market, where the
Colombians are not so well established. By all indications, however, the Medellin and
Cali organizations are moving quickly to establish wholesaling networks in Spain,
England, West Germany, and other Countries. The Colombians therefore apparently will
call the shots on international cocaine traffic for some time to come.
4. Money Laundering
Another area of narcotics activity to be considered is money laundering,
whereby proceeds, reasonably believed to have been derived from criminal activity, are
transported, transferred, transformed, converted, or intermingled with legitimate funds,
for the purpose of concealing or disguising the true nature, source, disposition, movement
or ownership of those proceeds. The goal of the money laundering process is to make
























Figure 3. Placement of Cash in the System Through Non-Traditional Institutions.
Figure 3 illustrates the methods whereby narcotics profiteers place their cash
profits into the legitimate financial system. Figure 4 shows some of the ways in which
these organizations manage to circumvent government tracking of transactions involving
$10,000 or more in cash. Figure 5 illustrates how narcotics organizations transfer cash
into non-cash monetary instruments in order to transport their profits across institutions
and borders. Figure 6 demonstrates how these organizations are able to circumvent
tracking of cash movements through the use of electronic transfers of funds. Figure 7
17
provides an example of how narcotics organizations can use an apparently legitimate
check cashing business to "launder" their profits.
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Figure 4. Placement of Cash Via Structuring.
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Cash in a Financial Institution
i









International Transport Domestic Transport
Figure 5. Conversion of Cash to Monetary Instruments for Transport.
Illicit Activity Produces Cash
1
Cash Deposited to Institution
I
Funds Wire Transfered to
Other Distant Institutions
Domestic International
Figure 6. Transfer of Funds by Wire.
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Cashes the Checks of the General Public
Checks are Deposited to Banks Cash is Issued to General Public
Figure 7. Money Laundering through Check Cashing.
The requirement to launder money stems from the desire to conceal criminal
activity. Although the term "money laundering" is generally associated with narcotics;
criminal activities such as gambling, prostitution, extortion, international arms sales, and
fraud schemes, also generate illicit proceeds needing to be concealed. Cash is the medium
of exchange in all manner of criminal activity. The ultimate goal of the criminal
organization is to manipulate its illicit proceeds in a manner which makes them appear to
have come from a legitimate source.
It is imperative to understand that money laundering is a vital component of all
criminal activity, and more particularly, or drug trafficking operations. The laundering of
drug proceeds usually involves the international movement of funds at some point in the
process. Payment must be made to the source country growers, to the processors, to
20
those responsible for the smuggling as well as to those who collect and launder the
proceeds. Accumulated proceeds must somehow be "legitimized" in order that the
traffickers may make use of their acquired wealth. It is the interception of those
proceeds where in law enforcement can inflict the most harm: the cartels replace seized
drugs from continued cultivation, but cannot easily replace seized proceeds. Comparable
efforts should be exerted in both stemming the flow of drugs into the US as well as
curbing the domestic and international laundering of drug related proceeds.
Money laundering schemes do not merely provide the conduits for financing
drug trafficking ventures; they also conceal the true nature and source of drug related
proceeds and disguise those funds to make them appear legitimate.
Cash is the medium of exchange in the world of drug trafficking. Thus, the most
basic problem to the money launderer is to convert the large amounts of cash received
from the drug transactions into more manageable monetary instruments or other assets
which conceal its illicit origins. The difficulty of the problem can be recognized when
one considers that street transactions are completed in small bill denominations, i.e., $5,
$10, $20 and $50's. A US. currency note weighs approximately one gram and there are
approximately 454 notes per pound. For example, one pound of US. twenty dollar notes
equals $9,080 and 100 pounds of US. one hundred dollar notes equals $4,540,000.
Criminal organizations need to convert the cash itself into a more easily
transferable/manageable form. In order to complete the money laundering scheme of
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concealing the true source and ownership of the proceeds, the illicit proceeds must be
laundered without leaving a recognizable audit trail.
19
The laundry process, regardless of the degree of complexity, is accomplished in
three basic steps, i.e., 1) Placement, 2) Layering and 3) Integration, and often involves the
utilization of offshore laundering systems. The three basic steps may occur as separate
and distinct phases; they may occur simultaneously; or more commonly, they may occur
in an overlapping fashion. The utilization of these three basic steps depends upon the
available laundering mechanisms and the requirements of the criminal organization.
These three stages of money laundering are delineated to facilitate the reader's
understanding of the overall process of money laundering, and to provide a consistent
framework for discussion.
a. Placement
The physical disposal of bulk cash proceeds. Recognizing that large volumes
of cash may draw immediate attention to their illegal source, criminals often physically
remove the bulk cash from the location of its acquisition. In a known narcotics trafficking
section of a large city, let alone in a small town, disposing of bulk cash would likely draw
law enforcement attention. Thus, criminal organization are driven to coalesce these
proceeds in areas where they are more easily recognized for what they actually are.
Although physical separation from the location of the acquisition may have occurred, the
placement of the bulk cash proceeds by any number of means into a) traditional or b)
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 1992.
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nontraditional financial institutions, c) into the retail economy or d) out of the US.
entirely, is the initial step to legitimize illegal proceeds.
b. Layering
Separating illicit proceeds from their source by creating complex layers of
financial transactions designed to disguise the audit trail of the illicit proceeds. If the
placement of the bulk cash has been successful (i.e., undetected, the money launderers'
activities become increasingly more difficult to uncover. The confusing and complicated
ways in which layer after layer of activities and transactions are piled on one another are
intended to make the traceability of the illegal, and thus seizable, proceeds extremely
difficult for law enforcement.
What follows is an overview of the known methods utilized in the layering
process:
Cash Converted Into Monetary Instruments
Material Assets Purchased with cash and converted or sold
Electronic funds transferee (EFT's)
c. Integration
The provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally derived wealth. Once the
layering process has been accomplished, the money launderer needs to provide a
legitimate looking explanation for his wealth. Integration schemes place the launderer
proceeds back into the economy in such a way that it reenters the banking system
appearing as normal business earnings. Unless the traceabililty of illicit proceeds has
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been established during the bulk cash placement or layering stages, it becomes extremely
difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate wealth. Detection and
identification of laundered funds at the integration phase is normally possible only
through undercover infiltration or violator assistance.
What follows are the various known methods utilized during the integration
process:
Real Estate Sales
Front Companies and Sham Loans
Foreign Bank Complicity
False Import/Export Invoices
d. Where Money Laundering is Vulnerable
The proven weak link in the laundering process is the bulk cash (Placement)
Stage. This is the stage in the laundering process at which the estimated billions is US.
drug related proceeds are most easily detected. 20
Most illegal activity involves other illegal activities. Most illegal activity
involves either US. or foreign currency. This medium of exchange may involve suitcases
of cash used in payment for a major delivery of drugs, arms, or secrets. Small
denomination bills ($20s and less), "street money," is what is collected as a result of
individual sales of drugs, pornography, gambling, or sex. Cash is what drives the criminal
activity and it is cash that is both the power behind and ultimately one of the greatest
vulnerabilities of the criminal,
ibid.
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History and experience has shown that large, well organized money
launderers must rely on the sophistication of both domestic and international financial
channels to move proceeds while providing anonymity to themselves and their clients. It
is the transfer of illegally generated proceeds through layers of front companies and
financial institutions affording bank secrecy that breaks the audit trail necessary to prove
the connection between the proceeds and the drug trafficker or other criminal. It is during
the coalescing of these proceeds, the preparation for the "placement" into financial
channels and/ or the transfer of the proceeds out of the US, that the cnminal is most
susceptible to detection. From the time that the criminal amasses large quantities of cash,
until the criminal successfully deposits the proceeds into a bank which affords
anonymity, the criminal must rely on couriers and financial channels to move the
proceeds thus providing a window of vulnerability. Every effort should be undertaken by
law enforcement to exploit this vulnerability. Once the bulk cash has been successfully
placed into a nation's legitimate financial channels, the job of combating money
laundering and tracing the proceeds becomes an increasingly difficult task for law
enforcement.
The following representations are related to businesses and professions
outside of the regulated financial sector. These businesses and professions are considered
to have actual or potential significance as vehicles utilized in the cash placement stage of
money laundering:
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Check Cashers, Bureaus de Change, Money Transmitters and Travel Agencies
Currency Exchanges
Money Transmitters
Precious Metals, Stones and Artwork Dealers and/ or Brokers
Casinos/Gambling Establishments of Businesses
Automobile/Airplane/ Boat/Real Estate Dealers and or Brokers
Professionals





1. Structure and Organization
The cocaine Syndicate is the organizational embodiment of the downstream
phases of the cocaine industry: refining, smuggling, and distribution. Like the coca lobby,
it is a potent political force in South America countries. The source of the cocaine
syndicate's power, however, is not so much numerical strength (for example, masses of
peasants who can blockade highways), but rather superior financial and logistical
resources, sophisticated weaponry, and extensive protection networks. In Colombia and
Bolivia, syndicate organizations have penetrated deeply into key decision making
26
structures (such as legislatures) and have virtually substituted for state power in parts of
the country.
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US law enforcement officials believe that Colombian syndicates are vertically
integrated "from the clandestine laboratories of Colombian to stateside distribution."
According to a 1986 US indictment against nine Colombian drug traffickers, the
operation of Jorge Ochoa's "family" extended from the purchase of raw materials through
and including cocaine production, transportation, distribution, and sale. 22 However, these
organizations seem to be more amorphous than criminal organizations in the United
States or Western Europe. Their boundaries are fluid, the cast of characters changes
continually, and the links in the chain are bound together in an intricate system of
contracts and subcontracts.
In Colombia, the cocaine trade is dominated by two coalitions of crime families;
the larger one is centered in Medellin and the other in Cali. 23 The capos of these
organizations typically reside on maintain residences in Medellin or Cali. The major
syndicates apparently export a large share, perhaps 70-80 percent,24 of the cocaine
manufactured in Colombia. They also handle some percentage of Bolivia and Peruvian
cocaine exports.
It can at one and the same time be said that the "cartels" control the cocaine
market and that there is apparently no effective cocaine cartel operating in Colombia; that
Lee, Rensselaer W. Ill, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine Trafficking and Political Power in the
Andean Countries, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1990.
Ricks, Thomas, "Indictment of Nine Alleged Gang Members Portrays How Cocaine Industry
Works," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1986.
Colombian Police Anti-Narcotics Balance, 1991.
ibid.
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is, the leading organizations seemingly cannot restrict production or maintain prices, as
expected when a "cartel" is in control of a market. (The US. wholesale price of cocaine
dropped from $60,000 per kilo in 1980 to $22,500 per kilo in 1988). 25 Competition,
especially in the inner city, clearly operates in the system. For example, Medellin and
Cali coalitions were at one time waging a war for control of the lucrative New York City
market. Also, the Medellin and Cali groups probably do not account for much more then
60-70 percent of the total world market; most of the balance is in the hands of Colombian
independents or Peruvian and Bolivian traffickers. Yet if the organizations involved in
the Colombian cocaine trade do not constitute a cartel in the strictest economic sense,
they are capable of coordinated action. Organization leaders form joint business
ventures, pool cocaine shipments, cooperate in insurance schemes, issue joint
communiques and even jointly plan assassinations.
The sheer size of syndicate operations requires the explicit coordination of many
transactions as well as a system of information gathering and record keeping. Cocaine
syndicates are too vulnerable to penetration by law enforcement agents. Hence, they have
to make large cash payments to the authorities to protect their laboratories and smuggling
routes and to keep their chief executives out of jail. Their system of protection also
includes a far-flung intelligence network that extends to enforcement agencies (and
subordinate bureaucracies) and even, perhaps, to U.S. embassies operating in
drug-producing countries. Syndicates also have a capacity for violence. Such violence or
the threat of it is used to discipline employees, to enforce contracts with business
Colombian Police Review -- Criminality, p. 410.
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associates, and to exterminate rival traffickers. In Colombia, violence is also a means of
influencing judicial outcomes — the plomo o plata 2b alternative — and of shaping the
government's overall policy on drug control. The parade in recent years of
syndicate-sponsored hits against uncooperative judges, public officials, and
newspapermen has no counterpart elsewhere in Latin America or in the United States.
2. The Nature of the Business
Syndicates tend to concentrate in down-stream activities — on refining,
transporting, and distributing coca products. Most are not engaged in coca cultivation,
although traffickers sometimes provide financing and even seeds and fertilizer to
growers. Organization differ greatly in the sophistication of their refining operations and
in their capacity to move cocaine in to major consumer markets. Here, a rough
comparison can be drawn between Colombian syndicates on the one hand and Peruvian
and Bolivian organizations on the other. The former buy coca paste and cocaine base —
mainly from Peru and Bolivia, convert these intermediates to cocaine hydrochloride
(CHCL), and ship the finished drug to distributors. Colombians dominate the coca trade;
according to the US National Narcotics Intelligence Committee, 75 percent of the refined
cocaine entering the United State in 1985-1986 was of Colombian origin.
In contrast, syndicate organizations in Peru and Bolivia are mainly in the business
of supplying crude cocaine to Colombian middlemen, who capture the value added in
further refining and in delivery of the product to overseas markets. Peru's trade is
especially poorly integrated.
An offer in which someone can choose between money (p/afa) or a bullet (plomo).
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The vast majority of cocaine leaves Peru in the form of cocaine base and is often
carried out in Colombian airplanes that fly the routes between the Upper Huallaga Valley
and the Amazon Basin. Colombia dominates smuggling and distribution, at least for
North American markets. Colombia's geographic location, its extensive transportation
links with the United States, and a large Colombian immigrant population in the United
States cities give Colombian traffickers an enormous commercial advantage over their
Bolivian and Peruvian counterparts.
3. The Physical Assets
Large syndicate organizations own or control an array of physical assets used in
running the cocaine business. The most important of these are laboratories, means of
transportation, and means of communication. Laboratories constitute the core of
syndicate operations. They may produce intermediate products, such as cocaine paste or
cocaine base (purified paste), or they may produce cocaine hydrochloride - the finished
cocaine consumed by most end users. The larger and better organizations, the more
sophisticated its processing capability.
Transport also is essential to syndicate from remote jungle laboratories to
customers and also to supply the laboratories with raw materials and chemicals.
Traffickers also build and maintain the literally thousands of clandestine airstrips in
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru27 . In addition, traffickers rely on sophisticated
communications systems to maintain secure communications within their organizations
and to monitor law enforcement surveillance.
Colombian Anit-Narcotics Review, 1991.
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Such systems include state-of-the-art radio equipment, sometimes outfitted with
scramblers (to prevent interception of message), and digital encryption devices. In
Colombia, as retired U.S. Army General Paul Gorman notes, the government
communications system is regularly intercepted "indeed used, by the narco-traffickers
who can track the movement of Colombian armed forces and aircraft and ships better
than their respective commanders, and know more surely where they are and where they
are going". 28
Two other assets are also critical to the functioning of cocaine syndicates:
weapons and money. Both factors carry political as well as business connotations. For
example, weapons provide security for installations but also convey an image of power.
Money is plowed into direct operating expenses and equipment, raw materials, salaries,
and the like ~ but also is used to buy protection, fund political campaigns, and even
create political movements.
Cocaine trafficking organizations in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru are better
armed than the anti-narcotics police ~ at least, the police believe that to be the case. Such
weapons are used for guarding laboratories, airstrips, and other facilities against both
police and predatory guerrilla groups. Personal escorts of leading drug capos also carry
weapons. 29
The financial resources available to drug trafficking organizations are seemingly
enormous. Colombia's major cocaine capos reported in 1984 that their business earned
Lee, Rensselaer W. Ill, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine Trafficking and Political Power in the
Andean Countries, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1990.
ibid.
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"an annual income close to $2 billion," but the earnings are probably far higher today.
The personal fortune of one of Colombia's most important capos, Pablo Escobar, was
estimated at $3 billion. 30 In such a case, however, it is difficult to determine what
percentage of the total amount is attributable to direct profits from cocaine sales, as
opposed to legitimate investments. Some drug money ends up in banks for investment
overseas, but a significant sum is spent domestically on overhead; for example, on
running laboratories, maintaining fleets of planes and helicopters, and carving out
airstrips and maintain networks of information in key government ministries.
The narcotics traffickers have poured millions of dollars into national electoral
campaigns, built grassroots political organizations. However, the South Americans
apparently have penetrated much further into the political realm. They have poured
millions of dollars into national electoral office, and even offered to pay off part of their
countries foreign debts. For South America drug lords, money is not just operating
capital or a means of acquiring luxury; it is also a powerful tool for influencing political
processes and outcomes. 31
4. The Human Assets
The structure of the cartels also can be defined in terms of their human assets.
There are several main categories of people: a core element comprising syndicate leaders
and key lieutenants ~ the latter often blood relatives — operators of cocaine laboratories,
and professionals such as lawyers, bankers, and financial managers. The most important
Henry, David "Pablo Escobar Gourria," Fortune, October 5, 1987, p. 153.
Lee, Rensselaer W. Ill, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine Trafficking and Political Power in the
Andean Countries, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1990.
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component of cocaine organizations is the system of protection and intelligence.
Protection as defined here, means general immunity for criminal operations — traffickers
pay people in authority to leave them alone. However, the cartel's ability to penetrate and
to corrupt enforcement agencies is limited; it cannot buy immunity for all its activities.
The organization consequently needs an intelligence network to supplement the
protection network and to provide advance warning of planned anti-drug operations such
as raids on laboratories, customs searches, and arrests.
The network includes informants strategically placed in police organizations, the
military, and key government ministries such as Justice, Interior, or Foreign Relations.
Sometimes cocaine traffickers themselves occupy positions of trust and responsibility
within the law enforcement bureauracracy. 32
The United States is also a target of syndicate intelligence gathering. Cocaine
syndicates reputedly have informants inside U.S. embassies in drug-producing
countries.
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U.S.' narcotics experts in Bogota (Colombia) have speculated that the cocaine
syndicate might have access to some of the U.S. embassy's cable traffic. The syndicate
reportedly pays informants three times as much money as the DEA. Colombian cartels
are also said to maintain a list of DEA agents and their code names — a list that is




5. The Domestic Market
In Colombia, the Medellin to Cali network imports raw materials, coca paste,
and cocaine base from Peru and Bolivia; processes these products; and exports refined
cocaine to international markets. However, a second cocaine industry in Colombia
centers around the 20,000 tons or so of coca leaf that are grown domestically. 34
Colombian leaf, which has an alkaloid content one-half to one-third of that grown in Peru
and Bolivia, is relatively expensive to process into high quality cocaine. Small peasant
entrepreneurs process the leaf into cocaine base; some of this enters the Medellin-Cali
refining system, and some is sold to independent cocaine refines. Colombian guerrillas —
notably the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FARC) - protect or control many of the
base laboratories. 35 The FARC also may have some CHCL processing capability,
although the FARC's technique for marketing their product is not clearly understood.
6. Industry Developments
As already noted, large Colombian syndicates seemingly do not constitute a
cartel in the sense of being able to control production and prices. Yet, there are
tendencies toward cooperation. Like mature criminal syndicates in the United States,
Colombian syndicates apparently have staked out territories, such as distribution markets
in major U.S. cities. Moreover, they actively help each other in certain respects. If one
family does not have enough cocaine on hand to meet delivery obligations to a customer,
it can obtain the necessary product from other families, which is increasingly common.
Narcotics Trafficking in Colombia, Uniandes, 1990.
Colombian Army Intelligence.
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Families take turns insuring each others' shipments of cocaine. If the cocaine is
confiscated en route, the insurer gets a percentage of the take usually between 30 and 50
percent of the price paid by the foreign wholesaler. 36
Colombian cartels are formidable opponents worthy of the best efforts of drug
law enforcement. As an example, the infamous Medellin cartel was actually a group or
conglomerate made up of the pooled resources of at least three principal organizations;
the Pablo Escobar Gaviria; The Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez; and Rodriguez Orguela
organizations, and at least seventeen other subordinate organizations. The structure of the
organizations that make up the Medellin cartel is fairly typical of cocaine organizations in
general.
With the exception of the "Bosses" of the organization, the management
hierarchy is fairly fluid. Group members may change position, or affiliation within the
cartel, occasionally branching out to start their own organization. Yet the key figures in
any group remain relatively constant and traditionally are close relatives, childhood
friends or neighbors from hometowns in Colombia.
The structure of a Colombian cocaine cartel can best be visualized using a
business conglomerate for comparison. If the cartel is a true conglomerate, the Escobar
Ochoas, and Silvio Caballeros are CEO's of the subsidiary corporations and form the
board of directors. It is the board's responsibility to control production level, supply,
balance prices, explore and develop new markets and settle disputes on a global level. In
fact, the drop in cocaine wholesale prices in the United States over the past several years
Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police.
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has forced the Medellin, Cali, and other cartel boards of directors to establish and develop
new product markets. Trend projections show an increasing emphasis on Europe as a
cocaine market as well a commodity trading center where southeast Asian heroin, still a
stable market leader in the United State, is bartered for cocaine, which is becoming a
growing profit maker in the European community. In addition, synthetic drugs have been
very successful in Europe, competing well with drugs derived from tropical plants. 37
Cocaine, however, is still of very great profit potential in Europe. Europe is looking
more and more attractive to drug traffickers. While the american market has grown
saturated in recent years, the European market price ranges between $20 and $40
thousand, double that in the US. 38 Cash-poor Eastern Europe is also a fertile ground for
the efforts of cocaine traffickers. In September of 1991, a jointly owned
Czech-Colombian company was found to have 98 kilos of cocaine on the premises. The
drug seizure was given a street value of $4 million, which is approximately $40,000 per
kilo.
39 The potential for new markets for the cartels is very threatening. The market for
herion appears to be growing world-wide, and the distribution networks that have proved
efficient for organizations like the Cali cartel offer a vehicle to further accelerate that
growth. 40
The cocaine trade is, in an economic sense, both a product and service market.
In the individual organization, the division of labor is highly complex and organized. At
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the low and mid-levels of this corporation, the managers are easily transferred but the
positions remain consistent. Crop production and refining are multiphase operations and
as such are labor intensive, and have been traditionally foreign-based, which limits the
FBI's ability to gather strategic operational intelligence on this aspect. In the wake of the
all out war between the Medillin cartel and the Colombian authorities, the Cali cartel is
reported to be moving its physical operations to jungle areas of Venezuela and Brazil. 41
In response to efforts to regulate precursor chemicals, the producers have started
recycling in their laboratories.
42 A trend to relocating final processing and refining steps
to clandestine laboratories within the United State has increased as the United States
develops greater ability to control or track precursor chemicals; However, this relatively
recent trend is not significant when considering the vast number of clandestine
laboratories located within the source countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Once
refined, the cocaine product must be transported to markets.
D. IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
Large infusions of dollars from any source are of great potential value to a
developing nation, and narco-dollars are no exception. Drug earnings stabilize a country's
currency, help finance needed imports, and may even enhance a country's credit rating.
Yet, establishing a link between drug money and economic growth, at least in the
conventional sense of the term, is difficult. A good argument can be made that the
"Cali High: Colombia", The Economist, December 25, 1993, v329, n7843.
"High in the Andes: Drugs War," The Economist, February 13, 1993, v326, n7798.
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cocaine economy has functioned as a hedge of sorts against economic disaster, absorbing
labor from moribund economic sectors (the Bolivia tin industry, for example)43 and
becoming a vital source of hard currency when world prices for traditional exports — oil,
gas, copper, and tin -- collapse. But that argument is not the same as saying that the
cocaine industry constitutes a positive factor in a country's development. Such a
conclusion might be warranted, but much depends on whether coca growers and cocaine
traffickers spend their money locally in economically productive ways. 44
Evidence on this point is vague - people in the drug trade do not publish
balance sheets or release annual reports. Yet, accounts from a variety of sources —
journalists, US. DEA and State Department officials, and government authorities in
producer countries ~ suggest that cocaine money (earned at all stages of production and
distribution) flows into the following activities:
Direct Capital and Operating Expenses: seeds and fertilizer, farm tools,
laboratory equipment, chemicals, raw materials, means of transport (aircraft, boats, and
trucks), and labor (pisadores, chemists, pilots, couriers, and the like).
Security: private armies, "enforcers," and contract assassins; automatic and
semiautomatic weapons (for example, Uzis, AR-15s); state-of-the-art radio equipment;
scramblers and coding devices; and computerized navigation systems.
Critical Services: lawyers, accountants, bank employees, investment counselors,
and the like.
43 UDAPE, "Informacion Economica," 1 986, p.1
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Protection and Intelligence: payoffs to politicians in office, law enforcement
officials, judges; and maintenance of an informant network in government agencies and
in U.S. embassies overseas.
Political Participation: contributions to political campaigns, public relations and
image-building (for example, promotion of pro-drug positions in the media), sponsorship
of candidate slates and political movements, and running for political office.
Private Welfare Activities: housing projects, sewer repair, medical services,
roads, schools, and charitable donations.
Legitimate Capital Investment: typically ranches (cattle breeding and horse
farming); commercial agriculture; banks; hotels; restaurants and discotheques; real estate
and construction companies; apartment complexes; sports clubs; radio stations and
publishing ventures; and various retail outlets, such as gas stations, car dealerships, and
drug stores.
Luxury Consumption: for example, yachts, Mercedes-Benz, beach-front condos,
gold chains, and antiques.
Cocaine earnings are largely recycled in the cocaine industry itself, expended on
capital and operating costs plant labor, equipment, and raw materials and on the creation
of a secure environment for the industry. Some of the money spent on inputs for the
industry may not enter the local economy at all for example, when Colombian traffickers
buy ether and acetone (precursor chemicals) from Brazil or coca paste or cocaine base
from Peru or Bolivia. Protection expenses provide employment and salary supplements,
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but little else. Private armies guard cocaine shipments, laboratories, and key industry
executives. Syndicate money does flow into legitimate business, although it does so
selectively. The Colombian syndicate as a whole invested an estimated $5.5 billion45 in
urban and rural real state between 1979 and 1988; real state has probably absorbed most
of the syndicate's repatriated funds.
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Service industries such as hotels, travel agencies,
real estate firms, transport companies, and banks also absorb trafficking funds. In Cali,
the Orejuela family at one time controlled a financial empire that comprised a Chrysler
dealership; a construction firm; a number of drug stores; a toy company, Mundo de Los
Ninos; an automobile race track; various real estate companies; 28 radio stations in
Colombia cities; and one of Colombia's largest banks, Banco de Los Trabaj adores. (The
Orejuelas rid themselves of the radio stations and their shares in the troubled bank.)47 The
suspicion is that aerial spraying companies belonging to Rodriquez Gacha and an
executive airline service (pilotos executivos) controlled through intermediaries by the
Ochoa family are being used to transport cocaine.
Relatively little narcotics money flows directly into core industries such as
mining, oil, power generation, and manufacturing. Such enterprises are either
government-owned or dominated by established economic elites who make it a point to
exclude drug dealers and other parvenus. Moreover, the economics of some drug
trafficking investments are suspect. For example, the enormous Posada Alemana hotel
complex built by Carlos Lehder in Armenia at a cost of roughly $5 million was touted as
ibid.
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a future "tourist epicenter" in Colombia's coffee-growing zone, but lost more than $1
million in its 3 year existence. Moreover, traffickers' businesses are sometimes just fronts
for money laundering and operate consistently at a loss. For all these reasons, the
Syndicate's legitimate investments are unlikely to catalyze the economic take off drug
producing countries in Latin America.
E. IMPACT ON SOCIETY
1. Violence
State Department officials like to talk about narco-terrorism, but drug violence
should be distinguished from terrorist violence. To the stray judge, policeman, or cabinet
minister who gets in the line of fire, this may seem like a distinction without a difference.
Still, terrorists who are interested in destabilizing the existing government target the
civilian population more broadly than drug traffickers; the latter do not randomly kill
civilians, but rather single combatants-enemies of the narcotics industry. Bombing public
buildings, hijacking airplane, destroying railway links, blowing up oil pipelines and
references, and attacking military bases are acts of revolutionaries, not drug dealers.
Foreign and Colombian businessmen are not afraid of being kidnapped by the cocaine
Syndicate; however, the threat of kidnapping by the FARC and the National Liberation
Army (ELN) is real and ever-present). 48 In some recent cases, traffickers have kidnapped
political figures to convey an anti-extradition message.
Subversive groups operating in Colombia.
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In late 1988, the incidence of violence in Colombia posed a general threat to
national security and appeared to challenge the country's thirty-year record of stable
civilian-led government. Colombia's tradition of violence dates from the war for
independence in the early nineteenth century; but the level of violence was increasing in
the late 1980s, for reasons ranging from land disquiets to criminal and political actions.
The perpetrators of violent incidents included the private groups and gunmen hired by the
major narcotics traffickers, guerrilla organizations, and members of right-wing
paramilitary groups, or "death squads". Their victims included government officials,
students, professionals, unionists, members of opposition political parties, and even petty
criminals.
During 1988 Colombian security forces were engaged in a highly publicized
campaign against narcotic traffickers. Enhanced by the military's two decades of
experience in counter insurgency and irregular warfare, the campaign focused on
eliminating clandestine processing laboratories, eradicating crops, prohibiting drug
shipments, and arresting and prosecuting known narcotics traffickers. In reaction, the
traffickers increasingly turned to co-optation and bribery, intimidation, and murder.
Prominent individuals whose views and activities were seen as compromising the
profitability of the traffickers' illegal operations frequently were subjected to death threats
some of which were carried out. Between 1984 and mid-1988, a minister of justice, an
attorney general, and a dozen Supreme Court judges were murdered by assassins
allegedly hired by narcotic traffickers.
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Colombian security forces in the late 1980s also continued to struggle against
the country's major guerrilla groups. Despite stepped-up military efforts, the guerrillas
continued to carry out robberies, kidnappings, ambushes of security personnel and
facilities, attacks on the economic infrastructure, and murders. During the late 1980s, the
Colombian government expressed a willingness to negotiate a political settlement,
provided that the insurgents agreed to disarm before talks were held.
Narcotic traffickers and subversives are not natural friends; they do not share a
common political and ideological agenda and they pursue basically different goals.
Guerrillas attempt to overthrow the government and to transform society; traffickers on
the other hand, seek above all to be left alone, aspiring to a kind of quasi-legality within
the political status quo. Drug dealers, especially the larger operators, do hold some anti
-establishment views: They are strongly anti U.S. and they favor a more egalitarian
structure.
Cocaine dealers and guerrillas compete bitterly for territory and resources and
for control over the coca growing peasantry. Guerrillas increase the industry's business
overhead; traffickers must either pay protection money (war taxes) to guerrillas or make
large outlays to guard their laboratories, drug shipments, and clandestine airfields. The
Colombian syndicate which invests much of its new found wealth in farms, ranches, and
landed estates in Colombia's relatively unprotected hinterland, is vulnerable to extortion
by FARC guerrillas because its class interest and those in Colombia's traditional rural
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elite are identical. In addition in many rural areas guerrillas try to drive a wedge between
local cocaine leaders and cultivators of coca leaves.
Clear signs in Colombia indicate that rural based guerrilla organizations levy
war taxes on the cocaine industry. The linkage is clear in the case of the FARC- "the
oldest-standing guerrilla movement in all of Latin America. 49 The FARC exercises
intermittent political and military control over some important coca-growing zones in the
southern and eastern Llanos region. In these zones, coca farmers and leaf processors
reportedly pay a tax of 10-15 percent on their outputs. The FARC also taxes the wages
of laborers in the coca fields at a rate of 7-10 percent. 50
However, the FARC's ability to shake down the Medellin-Cali syndicates is
problematic. There is little evidence on this point; however, two general observations can
be made. First, the cocaine syndicates (unlike the minor Syndicate of independent
processors and refiners) hire well-armed security forces to guard their laboratories, supply
routes, and cocaine shipments. The big cocaine operators can insulate their cocaine
operations (at least in part) against guerrilla extortion attempts. Much depends on the
local balance of forces at any given time: In southern Antioquia, a syndicate stronghold,
cocaine traffickers are less likely to pay taxes than in southern Caqueta, a region
predominantly controlled by the FARC. Second, the U.S. wholesale price of cocaine
dropped from $55,000 per kilo in 1980 to $15,000 per kilo in mid- 1988, creating strong
incentives for cocaine traffickers not to pay protection money to guerrillas. 51 No doubt
Bagley, Bruce, The Colombian Connection: The Impact of Drug Traffic on Colombia, 1986.
Los Jinetes de la Cocaina, 1 990.
ibid.
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the declining size of the "cocaine pie" has constituted an important factor in the recent
open hostilities between cocaine operators and guerrillas in both Colombia and Peru.
Allegations have been made that the FARC actively defends traffickers
laboratories, plantations, and airstrips. This may happen in some cases, but U.S. and
Colombian officials have been too ready to assume the existence of a FARC shield.
Occasional reports surface that unidentified people wearing green fatigues fire on police
on anti-drug missions, but a syndicate security force also could wear general military
uniforms. Aerial photographs of laboratory sites sometimes show evidence of a guard
contingent, hammocks, tents, shower stalls, and so on but how is one to know whether the
guards are guerrillas or traffickers hired guns? Police and military forces operating in
remote areas where both guerrillas and traffickers are active sometimes are fired upon
quite possibly by FARC and other guerrilla groups. Such incidents, however, may reflect
general guerrilla-government hostility rather than a conscious strategy of insurgents to set
up a defense perimeter around laboratories or cultivating areas.
Finally, a few reports contend that the FARC has actually moved beyond taxing
and protecting the cocaine traffic, that individual fronts cultivate their own coca and even
operate their own processing laboratories. Such a prospect is not beyond the realm of
possibility. Revolutionary organizations in other parts of the world have developed their
own production and sales capabilities. However, the FARC is formally at least, part of
the current peace process in Colombia. The FARC signed a truce agreement with the
government and via its civilian arm, the Union Patriotica, is actually participating in
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foreign exchanges become in "pesos" to pay expenses in foreign money which came from
other sources.
3. Domestic Drug Use
In addition to corrupting political and economic systems, narcotics trafficking
generated a domestic drug problem. In the early 1980's, a widespread addiction to basuco
developed among Colombian youth. A highly addictive and very damaging form of
cocaine normally smoked with marijuana or tobacco, basuco was dumped by the
cocaine smugglers on the Colombian market because it was not export quality. Sold
cheap, it soon became more popular in many cities than marijuana, leaving thousands of
addicts in its wake, many suffering from permanent nervous disorders.
The cocaine Syndicate in Colombia has made every effort to disassociate itself
publicly from basuco trade. It is not difficult to see why. Basuco consumption is one of
Colombian's major public health problems — an estimated 200,000 to 600,000 people
regularly use the drug. 52 Civic and professional groups have increasingly labored to raise
public concern and professional groups have increasingly presented to Colombia's
Attorney General in 1984, Colombia's top 100 cocaine traffickers denied any association
with the basuco trade.
4. Environmental
Among the rest of human tradgedy that comes about as a result of the cocaine
trade, it is often easy to overlook the impact that production is having on the
environment. The damage is not limited to the destruction of native fauna to clear more
Colombia: A Country Study, Library of Congress, p. 1 30.
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room for the growing of coca. One year of Peruvian cocaine processing, for instance,
contributed the following to the Amazon feeder river system: 53
57 million liters of kerosene (the same volume as a supertanker)
22 million liters of sulfuric acid
1 6,000 metric tons of lime
3,000 metric tons of carbide
6 million liters of acetone
6 million liters of toluene
1 0,000 tons of toilet paper
"Fact Sheet: Coca Production and the Environment," US Department of State Dispatch,
March 2, 1992, v3, n9.
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III. THE ALLIES
In order to evaluate the impact of the ongoing effort against drug trafficking, it is




There are more than 32 federal agencies involved in the multifaceted effort to
reduce the supply of and demand for drugs. The agencies are grouped by function,
beginning with those with central policy roles, followed by international efforts,
interdiction, domestic enforcement, data gathering, intelligence and USA efforts.
The National Narcotics Act of 1984 created the National Drug Enforcement
Policy Board. This cabinet level Board consists of the Attorney General as a Chairman
and the secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Transportation and Health and Human
Services, as well as the Directors of Central Intelligence and the Office of Management
and Budget, as members (see Figure 8). The Congress expresses its intent to:
( 1
)
Maintain a national and international effort against illegal drugs;
(2) Coordinate fully the activities of the federal agencies involved: and
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(3) Charge a single competent and responsible high level Board of the U.S.
Government, chaired by the Attorney General, with responsibility to
coordinate U.S. policy with respect to National and International drug law
enforcement.











Figure 8. Organization of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board.
Source: National drug enforcement policy board interim report to
Congress, July 1985.
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a. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
As the primary Federal anti-drug agency, the DEA is charged with enforcing
the controlled substance laws and regulations of the U.S. DEA also participates in
non-enforcement programs to reduce the demand for drugs. Part of the Department of
Justice, DEA includes 2,400 special agents in 121 domestic field offices and 61 offices in
over 40 countries.
DEA's primary objectives are:
To bring to bear all the Federal resources on the arrest, prosecution, and
immobilization of major drug trafficking organizations.
To reduce the supply of illicit drugs from source countries, thereby reducing the
availability of illicit drugs in the U.S.
To significantly reduce the diversion of controlled substances from the legitimate
channels in which they are manufactured.
To enlist the active participation of state and local governments and law
enforcement agencies in the national drug eradication program.
The DEA is evolving their strategy for fighting the drug war. One area of
focus for the agency will be an increase in the use of court-ordered wiretaps. Another
area where the agency seeks to increase its resources are the major port cities of South
America and Panama, where the majority of cocaine is thought to pass on its way to retail
markets in the US. They will try to increase the number of informants in those locations
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who will pass information to the interdiction agencies. Additionally, the organization
plans to assign more intelligence operatives to the larger cartel families. Objectives also
include increasing the number of drug-ferrying aircraft interdictions and reducing the
amount of precursor chemicals available to the producers.
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b. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
Responsible in large part for U.S. drug interdiction efforts, the Coast Guard's
strategy has been mainly directed toward intercepting mother ships as they transit the
major passes of the Caribbean. To effect this "choke point" strategy, the Coast Guard
conducts both continuous surface patrols and frequent surveillance flights over the waters
of interest, and boards and inspects suspect vessels at sea. In the past major Coast Guard
resources have been concentrated in the "choke points" traditionally transversed by
traffickers. Cutters now more frequently patrol the Bahamas, the eastern passes of the
Caribbean and the Gulf, Atlantic and Pacific coastal areas.
During the past several years the Coast Guard has increased the number of
cutter patrol days and aircraft operating hours devoted to drug interdiction, increasing
their ability to respond quickly to sightings and other intelligence. In addition, the Coast
Guard is deploying leased Sea Based Aerostats (SBA's), which are small tethered
balloons equipped with surface search radar, tethered offshore at sufficient altitude to
greatly increase its range. As part of a coordinated operation, surface target information
Gordon, W., "A New Assault on Cocaine," US News and World Report, January 11,1 993,
v114, nl.
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is passed to a command and control cutter for evaluation and deployment of other
assigned units surface and air.
Better intelligence remains an important factor in increasing the Coast
Guard's overall interdiction effectiveness. The most critical need is timely and accurate
information on the number, identity, location and destination of vessels and aircraft
carrying contraband which are bound for the United States. During the past two years
improvements have been made in the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of
intelligence. A new intelligence coordination center in Washington, D.C. maintains a 24
hour all-source watch to exploit all intelligence systems available to the Coast Guard, and
produces intelligence tailored to the needs of operational commanders. The Coast Guard
is also continuing liaison with the law enforcement community's intelligence network. 55
c. U.S. Customs Service
The U.S.. Customs Service participates in several multi-agency investigative
programs, including the Florida Joint Task Group and the President's Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Force. The efforts of these two programs alone resulted in 1 , 1 94
arrests and drug seizures of 35,702 pounds of cocaine, 132 pounds of heroin, and
3,848,293 pounds of marijuana from FY 1982 to FY 1985. 56
Prompted by the increasing sophistication of violators of critical technology
and trade laws, including individuals in drug-related activities, the Customs Service
established an Office of Intelligence in 1981. Customs-acquired intelligence of national
U.S. Coast Guard Narcotics Interdiction Initiatives, 1-5 (USCG Document, October, 1985)
U.S. Customs Service.
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security interest is, for the first time, actively being disseminated to community agencies,
and the intelligence community is currently developing information useful for drug
enforcement. The development of secure communications facilities within the Customs
Service, currently underway, will further enhance this capability.
The Customs Aviation and Marine Programs are consistently changed and
upgraded to reflect new technologies and equipment and improved tactics and strategy.
Drug smugglers have responded to these programs by adjusting their routes to elude the
increased effectiveness of enforcement officials.
The Customs Service has developed teams of inspectors and canine
enforcement officers to more thoroughly examine persons, conveyances, and cargo
determined to be high risk. These mobile teams, which use highly trained dogs to detect
drugs, allow Customs to release cargo and passengers deemed to be low risk without
examination, thus speeding the entry of most people and cargo. The teams comprise 12
percent of the inspectional workforce, but have accounted for the greater proportion of
the drug seizures. During the first 9 months of FY 1985, they have been responsible for
66 percent (10,269 pounds) of the hashish, 87 percent (876 pounds) of the cocaine, and
40 percent (243 pounds) of the heroin that has been seized by inspectors. 57
During the past three years, the Customs Service has attempted to convince
the commercial air and sea carriers of their responsibilities in the effort to halt drug
trafficking. As part of this initiative Customs contacted the major carriers and signed
U.S. Customs Service and America' s Habit -- Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized
Crime, 1986.
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cooperative agreements with a number of them. These set out specific measures designed
to prevent and detect the use of commercial vessels and aircraft that smuggle drugs and
other contraband. Customs works closely site carriers, to apprise them of their
vulnerabilities through regular meetings; to provide a training program on cargo, aircraft,
and facility security; to perform security surveys; and to compile threat assessments.
This cooperation between Customs and commercial carriers has lead to the detection of
drugs and the transmittal of valuable intelligence to local customs officials.
d. Department ofDefense
In 1981 Congress passed legislation clarifying statutory restrictions on the
use of Department of Defenses (DOD) resources for law enforcement purposes. As a
result, the Department of Defense now has greater freedom to support Federal law
enforcement agencies. DOD resources play an important role in the Federal drug
interdiction program by providing surveillance and support services, such as using
aircraft to search for smugglers and Navy ships to tow or escort vessels seized by the
Coast Guard to the nearest US port. As of the end of September 1985, the DOD has been
involved in 38 vessel seizures.
The fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended unanimously in early 1985
that the U.S. military be engaged to an unprecedented extent in fighting drug trafficking
and production. It called for the implementation of a massive new program in which
military forces would expand their present supportive role by becoming involved in drug
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interdiction, in training Central American nation's anti-drug forces, and in providing
needed weapons and equipment.
e. The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS)
The (NNBIS) attempt to accomplish comprehensive planing in the limited
area of interdiction at or approaching USA borders. NNBIS was created by the President
in march 23, 1983 and is directed by the vice President.
NNBIS mission is to improve border interdiction by accomplishing a
threefold goal: to continue to improve interagency coordination among law enforcement
agencies; to maximize the participation of the Military service and Federal Agencies
involved in drug interdiction: and to increase and provide interaction for intelligence
community involvement in interdiction efforts. Participating agencies include the U.S.
Customs Service, the US Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration (of
particular importance is the contribution of DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center-EPIC) the
Border Patrol, Federal Aviation Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Department of State.
NNBIS itself consists if a headquarters staff in Washington, DC and six regional offices:
Miami, New Orleans, El Paso, New York, Chicago and Long Beach, California.
Actual interdiction at or approaching U.S. borders is accomplished by
individual agencies during single agency multi-agency special operations. The role of
NNBIS is to provide necessary equipment, intelligence, detection and trend analysis
support. Specific NNBISD contributions to drug seizures consist of direct support, such
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as the passing of "real-time" information, general information, or regional analysis.
NNBIS staffs, consisting of agency-contributed personnel in both Washington and the
regional centers, coordinate with contributing agency staff to lay the groundwork for
special initiatives, which then can proceed in a timely fashion to enhance drug law
enforcement efforts. Of critical importance in understanding NNBIS' role is the fact that
the activity has no funding of its own. It is entirely dependent upon agency contributions
of manpower and intelligence and does not have a direct operational authority. It can only
inform and advise its constituent agencies concerning opportunities for coordinated or
expanded operations. Thus, criticisms of NNBIS, alleging that many seizures would have
occurred anyway, even if NNBIS did not exist, 58 miss the point. Individual agencies are
intended, indeed mandated, to carry out their missions, including contraband seizures.
NNBIS is intended to supplement, not replace, those efforts. It has a steadily improving
record of doing so, a fact recognized even by some critics.
2. Funding
The Federal budget for narcotics control grew notably between 1981 and 1987,
to $3.9 billion, as shown in Table I. In the early nineties, the budget has tripled,
approaching $12 billion dollars. Table II lists a percentage breakdown of funding
dedicated to anti-demand (law enforcement, treatment, prevention) and anti-supply
(interdiction) efforts. The Bush administration's Andean Initiative and other anti-supply
efforts have countered the expansion of demand oriented programs, the result being that
U.S. General Accounting Office, Coordination of Drug Interdiction Efforts, (CAO) GGP.
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anticipated that the Clinton administration will increase spending on the demand side of
the cocaine problem, which has left many people nervous about the corresponding cuts in
spending on interdiction which will likely emerge. 59 Bill Clinton is likely to favor a
strong anti-drug approach as long as it puts more policemen on the street. 60
B. COLOMBIA
1. Organization
The historical development of the national drug policy demonstrates that the
national response to drug abuse and drug trafficking has become more complex over the
time. A good indicator of the present complexity of the national response is the fact that
twenty National agencies are now involved in reduce the supply and demand of drugs.
The agencies are grouped by function, beginning with those with central policy roles,
,followed for interdiction, data gathering and intelligence, including Military, Police, and
civil personnel. The focus in this discussion will be the agencies involved in the supply
side. The command structure of Colombian security forces is illustrated in Figure 9.
"Under the Eye of the Police", The Economist, May 8, 1 993, v327, n781 0.
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Eastern River Forces Commander
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Advisory Capacity
Figure 9. Command Structure of the Colombian Security Forces (1992).
a. The National Council ofNarcotics (CNE)
The National Government created the National Council of Drugs narcotics,
this cabinet level Board consists President of Colombia the Ministers of Government,
Justice, Defense, Health, Public Finance, the Commander General of the Military Forces,
Director of the National Police and the Chief of Administrative Security Department.
The principal functions of this council are:
( 1 ) Maintain a national effort against illegal drugs
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(2) Coordinate the activities of the Agencies involved
(3) Reviewing, evaluating, and developing Colombia Government Policy, strategy
and resources with respect to drug law enforcement efforts
(4) Facilitating coordination of all Colombian Government Efforts to halt national
and international trafficking of illegal drugs
(5) Coordinating the collection and evaluation of information necessary to
implement Colombia's policy
According to the Constitution of 1990, the president of the Republic of Colombia
serves as the commander in chief of the country's armed forces. In addition to this
obligation to maintain public order, the president is empowered to provide for the
country's external security. The president has the right to declare war, with the consent of
the Senate, or, if deemed necessary to repel a foreign invasion, without such consent. The
president also has constitutional authority to conclude and ratify peace treaties and is
responsible for reporting to Congress on their conclusion of such pacts. Military
promotions for general and flag officers as well as military appointments are conferred by
the president of the republic, subject to the confirmation of the Senate.
In case of foreign war or domestic strife, the president, with the approval of the
cabinet, is authorized to declare a state of siege in all or part of the republic, thereby
placing it under martial law. The president, also upon approval of the cabinet, can
declare a state of emergency in response to events that pose an imminent threat to the
social and economic order.
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The specific responsibilities of the armed forces and National Police are detailed in
a series of articles in the Constitution. This series of articles is entitled "The Public
Force". All Colombians are required to perform military service and have and obligation
to bear arms to defend the nation. The length of service and terms of exemption from
service are to be determined by law. As amended by presidential decree in 1968, the
constitution provides for the organization of a standing army to guarantee national
defense. It also specifies that details relating to the army including the number of troops,
the regulation of promotions, and the definition of the rights and duties of military
personnel are matters to be decided according to legislation. The organization of a
national militia and National Police, also to be established according to specific laws.
The constitution calls for a nonpartisan, apolitical military. The article restricts the
military's right of assembly, "except by order of legitimate authority," as well as its right
to petition the government, except on "matters that relate to the good service and morale
of the army, and in accordance with its laws."
In addition, the article stipulates that military and police personnel are ineligible to
vote while on active duty and are not permitted to be candidates for elective office.
b. Armed Forces
According to the Constitution, the president of the republic serves as
commander in chief of the country's military and police forces. The president appoints the
armed forces' highest ranking officer (by tradition an army general) to serve as head of
the Ministry of National Defense. During the 1980s, the minister of national defense held
62
both administrative and operational authority over the three armed services and the
National Police. As authorized by the minister of national defense, military operations
were executed under the mandate of the General Command of The Military Forces.
c. The National Army
In 1992, The National Army was composed of 109,000 active-duty soldiers,
including approximately 26,000 conscripts. The troops under the command of the
National Army represented some 80 percent of Colombia's total military personnel.
Each of the four army divisions had territorial command over two to three of
the country's military regions and was organized into three brigades. Each brigade had a
minimum of two infantry posed of three infantry battalions, one mechanized cavalry
group, and one battalion each of artillery, engineer and service personnel. In all, the five
divisions commanded thirty infantry battalions, six mechanized cavalry groups, eight
artillery battalions, six engineer battalions, twelve service battalions, and five military
police battalions.
d. The National Navy
In 1992, the National Navy had about 15,500 personnel, including
approximately 5,000 marines, 1,500 coast guard personnel, and 500 conscripts. Personnel
under the command of the National Navy represented 12 percent of the country's total
military forces.
From 1978 to 1988, the navy's Corps of Marine Infantry (Cuerpo de Infantry
de Marina) benefited from a gradual buildup. The marine corps was organized into five
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battalions. Two battalions each reported to the Atlantic Marine Brigade and the Pacific
Marine Brigade, which corresponded to the navy's Caribbean Command and the Pacific
Command, respectively. A jungle battalion, first organized in 1978, was also part of the
Western River Forces Command. Coordinated marine-army operations frequently were
carried out during the late 1980s under the operational control of the army. In 1988
analysts anticipated that the EE-9 Cascavel armored cars and EE- 1 1 Urutu armored
personnel carriers would be used to form a mechanized element in each marine brigade.
In 1979 the navy organized the small Coast Guard Corps (Cuerpo de Guardacosta) to
carry out coastal patrol duties and operate some aircraft.
e. The Colombian Air Force
The Colombian Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Colombiana-FAC) had some 9,500
personnel in 1992, including approximately 1,900 conscripts, about 8 percent of the
country's military forces. Members of the air force reserve were estimated approximately
1,900.
The principal units assigned to the FAC's commands included two fighter
squadrons, three squadrons dedicated to counterinsurgency missions (including squadron
of helicopters under the tactical air support command), a reconnaissance squadron, and a
transport squadron. The two fighter squadrons were assigned to the first Air Combat
Command with headquarters at the country's principal air base, the German Olano
Military Air Base at Palanquero in Cundinamarca department.
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/ The National Police
During the 1980s, the National Police remained directly subordinate to the
minister of national defense. Officers holding military rank filled key posts within the
National Police. Their uniforms and insignia of rank, however, were different from those
worn by members of the country's military forces. Having passed through the police's
own professional training institutions, these men were believed to have dedicated their
professional careers to service with the force. Such career officers did not alternate
between military and police service, as was customary with some Latin American armed
forces.
In 1969 National Police personnel were estimated to total about 42,000.
Recruitment plans announced during the mid-1970s projected an increase in the size of
the force to some 80,000 personnel by 1990. Yet despite the increased challenges to
internal security, the size of the force did not increase significantly and remained
relatively constant at some 50,000 between 1974 and 1984. In 1992 the size of the
National Police was 87,000, of whom approximately 10 percent were civilians.
The headquarters of the National Police was located in Bogota. The force's
organization appeared to parallel the military's headquarters command it was divided into
separate functional departments, including personnel (F-l), intelligence (F-2), operations
(F-3), and logistics (F-4). Personnel not attached to the headquarters staff were deployed
in each of the country's administrative departments, in which a police commander served
as the ranking police officer.
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In addition to the force's primary charge to handle common crimes, its major
responsibilities included narcotics interdiction, some counterinsurgency work,
participation in civic action in rural areas, and riot control in the country's urban centers.
Other duties included enforcement of traffic regulations, supervision of public recreation
areas, provision of security at gold and emerald mines, provision of security in the
transport of valuables between government banks and on the national railroads, and
administration of and provision of guards for the country's prison system.
A number of special police units functioned under the overall jurisdiction of
the headquarters operations command. They included the Radio Patrol Group, the
Antimugging Group, the Private Surveillance Group, the Highway Police, the Tourist
Police, the Juvenile Police, the Railroad Police, and the Operational group against
Extortion and Kidnappings. The Antinarcotics Police were important not only in the
seizure of narcotics and the arrest of those involved but also in helping search out and
destroy the concealed air landing strips and processing laboratories used by the narcotics
traffickers. The National Police's Carabineros were a special rural police force that
carried out counterinsurgency missions, frequently in conjunction with army units.
Headquarters at the department and national territory capitals, the Carabineros were
maintained in squadrons that were separate from those of the regular police; they wore
distinctive uniforms and often traveled as mounted units. The National Police also
administered and manned the country's fire departments. In support of these various
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police units, the National Police maintained a small air section equipped with some
thirty light helicopters and one HS-748 airplane.
g. The Department ofSecurity Administration (DAS)
The DAS was the principal organization responsible for enforcement of laws
relating to national security. This organization had a national role comparable to that of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States. The formal responsibilities
under the DAS's mandate included investigating crimes against the internal security of
the state, fraud against the state and its financial institutions, breaches of the public faith,
and crimes affecting individual liberty and human rights. The DAS also was responsible
for screening and maintaining records on foreigners who entered the nation and for
enforcing immigrations laws. To carry out its mission, the DAS had both investigative
and intelligence-gathering responsibilities.
h. The Customs Service
The Customs Service in Colombia is a department of the Ministry of Public
Finance. Direct mandates for the Customs Service are:
Control of the borders and prevention of smuggling
Monitoring import and export products and practices
Interception of narcotics
The Customs Service engages in anti-narcotics activity at border points,
ports, airports, and along the borders and coastlines, having land, sea, and air jurisdiction.
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i. The Narcotics Police
The Colombian government has developed over the time different strategies
to combat the narcotics trafficking into the national territory. The Antinarcotics Police
was first created with the following mission:
Conduct activities to control the narcotics trafficking into the Colombian
territory; and also with these particular functions:
Eradicate crops of marijuana, coca and poppy.
Control of raw materials and chemicals used in the process of narcotics.
Detection and destruction of laboratories.
Become useless clandestine runways
Control of spaceship and people included in activities of narcotics trafficking.
In order to accomplish the mission of the Antinarcotics Police was
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Figure 10. Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police Organization Structure.
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2. Funding
Table III. The Colomb an Defense Min
US$ Millions
istry Budget, 1982-1992.












Source: Plancacion Ministerio de Defensa, 1992.
Table IV. U.S. Assistance to Colombia, 1989-1991
Type 1989 1990 1991
Military 73.1 93.2 37.1
Law Enforcement 10 20 32.5
Economic 2.8 2.1 50
Source: Compiled from data of the U.S. House Foreign
and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (1992).
Affairs Committee (1991)
Table V. U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Anti-Narcotic Police, 1990-1993.




Source: Reporte Policia Antinarcoticos, 1993.
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During the late 1980s, the increased threat to national security posed by renewed
guerrilla activities and the growing power of Colombian narcotics traffickers provided the
rationale for considerable increases in military expenditures. In 1987 the armed forces
budget stood at $274 million dollars, an amount nearly twice the spending level set a
decade earlier. This amount represented nearly 15 percent of the federal government's
total public expenditures for 1987. making military spending the second highest item
after education in terms of official budgetary priorities. This proportion of spending was
comparable to expenditures in the mid-1960s, a period when the armed forces were
involved in an intensive effort to defeat the country's domestic insurgents. The proportion
of government expenditures on defense in 1987 represented a significant increase over
allocations approved during the early 1980s. At that time, military spending ranged from
7 to 10 percent of central government expenditures. In comparison, during the mid-1950s
the Colombian armed forces received about 20 percent of the government's budget.
Military expenditures for 1987 represented only an estimated 1 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP). As a proportion of GDP, this level remained relatively
constant throughout the 1980s, but it reflected a decline from an average of 1 .7 percent of
GDP during the 1970s. As a proportion of the gross national product (GNP), military
spending also remained relatively constant through the mid-1980s. In 1985 military
expenditures as a percentage of GNP were estimated at 1 .2 percent, a level of spending
proportionate to that maintained a decade earlier.
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Currently, the Colombian Defense and Security Forces receive financial and
instructional assistance from the U.S. This is not to say, however, that a full partnership
exists. For the most part, training is provided to Colombians at times and places deemed
appropriate by the U.S., rather than as a result of consultation between the two countries.
As a result, there has been no centralized training of Colombian personnel in existing
academies and training centers. Rather, operational training provided by the U.S. usually
occurs in the field, and personnel who have received such training are rotated to other
duty assignments and replaced by personnel who lack these skills.
Additionally, financial arrangements between the U.S. and Colombia are, at
best, tenuous. On several occasions, the Colombian government and its agencies have
been promised funds and based operational planning upon those funds, only to find out
that the money is either no longer available, or will not be available within the original
time frame. In either case, operations are canceled, and the confidence of the command
and rank and file military member is eroded.
Colombia is the principal beneficiary of the Andean Trade Act, passed in
December of 1991. Under the terms of the legislation, Colombia stands to receive more
than S80 million in trade. 61
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C. U.S.-COLOMBIAN COOPERATION
Although Colombia and the U.S. had friendly and cordial relations during the
nineteenth century, relations were strained during the first two decades of the twentieth
century as a result of the involvement of the President Theodore Roosevelt's
administration in the Panama revolt. The U.S. was the major market for Colombia's
leading export and source of revenue: coffee.
A U.S. agreement to provide a military training mission and a 1940 bilateral trade
agreement strengthened pre-World war two relations between Bogota and Washington.
Colombia's partnership with the USA prompted it to contribute troops to the UN
Peacekeeping Force in the Korean War (1950-53). Colombia also provided the only Latin
American troops to the UN Emergency Force in the Suez conflict (1956-58).
Colombia became one of the largest recipients of United States assistance in Latin
America during the 1960s and early 1970s. Much of the United States aid was designed
to enable Colombia to ease internal economic development through industrialization, as
well as agrarian and social reforms. Nonetheless, Colombian policy makers had become
disenchanted with the Alliance for Progress program, conceived during the administration
of President John F. Kennedy, that called for extensive United States financial assistance
to Latin America as well as Latin American support for social change measures. These
social change measures include agrarian reform undertaken with United States economic
assistance. Many felt that Colombia's economic dependence on the USA had only
increased. By 1975, however, the U.S. was purchasing only 28 percent of Colombia's
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exports, as compared with 40 to 65 percent during the 1960s. In 1985 the United States
accounted for 33 percent of Colombian exports and 35 percent of Colombian imports.
Although Colombia voted fairly consistently with the USA in international
security forums, such as the UN General Assembly and Security Council, its willingness
to follow the lead of the USA within the inter-American system had become less
pronounced by the mid- 1970s. In 1975 President Lopez Michelsen resumed diplomatic
relations with Cuba. He also refused further American economic assistance to Colombia
and terminated funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development,
complaining that his nation's unhealthy economic dependency resulted from foreign aid.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Colombia's standing as the major source of illegal cocaine
and marijuana smuggled into the U.S. plagued relations between these two countries.
However, the bilateral Extradition Treaty Between Colombia and the U.S., signed by
both countries in 1979, meant U.S. $26 million in United States aid and helped to
produce what Washington considered to be a model antinarcotics program. Colombian
President Betancur initially refused to extradite Colombians as a matter of principle. By
mid-term, however, he changed his position after becoming alarmed over the implications
for Colombia's political stability of the increasing narcotics-related corruption and drug
abuse among Colombian youth and the Medellin Cartel's assassination of Justice Minister
Lara Bonilla. In May 1984, following the murder of the strongly antidrug minister,
Betancur launched a "war without quarter" against the cartel and began extraditing drug
traffickers to the USA. During the November 1984 to June 1987 period, Colombia
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extradited thirteen nationals including cartel kingpin Carlos Lehder Rivas and three
foreigners to the United States. (A United States jury convicted Lehder in May 1988 of
massive drug trafficking.)
In a major setback for the antidrug effort, however, in June 1987 the Colombian
Supreme Court unconstitutional a law ratifying the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty.
United States authorities had more than seventy extradition cases still pending. The
annulment of the extradition treaty resulted from a ruling of the Supreme Court in
December 1986 invalidating the treaty's enabling legislation. New enabling legislation
signed by President Barco worked only until February 17, 1987. Consequently, the only
course left open to the Barco administration was to resubmit the enabling legislation to
Congress, which was not eager to act, being caught in the same world of threats and
bribes.
The extradition issue came to a head after Ochoa was released from prison on
December 30, 1987, prompting the United States to protest. The U.S. endorsed the
Colombian Supreme Court's suggestion that extradition decisions could be made directly
by the Colombian government, thereby bypassing the court, under an 1888 treaty between
the two countries. Barco's justice minister argued, however, that the old treaty was
revoked by the 1979 treaty. In any event, in early May 1988 the Supreme Court rejected
the use of existing laws to send more drug traffickers to the U.S. for trial. The Council of
State consequently suspended the issuing of warrants for the arrests for the purpose of
extradition of cartel leaders, beginning with Escobar. Consequently, for future
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extradition's, the Congress must either pass a new law to validate the 1979 extradition
treaty, or dispense with the treaty altogether in order to use the 1933 multilateral
Montevideo Convention as the basis for extradition.
The Andean Initiative was announced by US President George Bush. The goal of
the Andean Initiative was to reduce the amount of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine)
entering the US by 15% within two years and by 60% within ten years. 62 These
objectives were to be accomplished through Drug Control funding sources, as well as by
tying economic and other aid to narcotics enforcement efforts in producer countries.
More than this, the initiative included economic incentives, resulting in an initial trade
package deal with Colombia valued at $64 million dollars in the first year.
Gustavo de Greiff, the Colombian State Prosecutor, has initiated discussions with
the leadership of the Cali cartel. The expectation is that key leaders and members will
submit to law enforcement authorities for light prison sentences in special prisons, and
they will also foreswear involvement in drugs. Observers feel that the chances for
success are so high that preparations for a special prison to house over 300 members of
the cartel are being made. Is has been reported that the group includes Gilberto
Rodriguez Orejuels, the cartel's reputed leader. 63 So far, key lieutenants in the
organization have surrendered as a result of this initiative. The US is reportedly worried
about the prospects of an agreement between the Colombian government and the Cali
cartel. The various US organizations involved in drug interdiction are all appently eager
"High in the Andes: Drugs War," The Economist, February 13, 1993, v326, n7798.
"Cali High: Colombia", The Economist, December 25, 1993, v329, n7843.
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to target the Cali cartel with the same approach used in destroying the Medillin cartel.
Some of these organizations have reportedly supplied the Colombian authorities with
intelligence showing that the Cali cartel has no plans to give up the drug business. 64
Some observers have suggested that Colombian leader Gavira has already achieved his
principal aim of ending drug violence by achieving the destruction of the Medillin
cartel.
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The Colombian organizations invovled in the battle with the Colombian cartels
have the unique ability to bring the war on drugs directily to the cartels Colombian
operations. When these organizations have focused efforts against the cartels, they have
produced results. On the other hand, the cartels are moving more and more of their
physical operations out of the country. While the Colombian authorities can be credited
by achieving this situation through applying pressure, the ability to apply that pressure
stops at the Colombian border.
The US will most probably expect the same level of intensity to be applied to
putting pressure on the higher elements of the cartel organization, such as finance and
control, but this will be an altogether different matter for the Colombian authorities.
There is much discussion about the cocaine smuggled out of Colombia, but somewhat
less about the profits that are smuggled out of the US. It is also possible that some of that
profit is maintained in the US. Just as interdiction efforts seem to be netting a small
percentage of the amount of cocaine, so other efforts are netting but a small percentage of
64
"Cali High: Colombia", The Economist, December 25, 1993, v329, n7843.
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Robinson, L, Witkin, C, "Cracks in the Drug War," US News and World Report, March 2,
1992, v 112, n8.
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the profits. The chances that the Colombian authorities will be more successful in these
areas, which require more extensive intelligence resources, than in attacking the physical
operations are not great.
In terms of international relations, Colombia has been an active member of the UN
since the orgamzation was founded. It belonged to numerous UN organizations, including
the General Agreement on Tanffs and Trade (GATT), the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD). Under the National Front government, Colombia became
a major recipient of funds and programs from international bodies, such as the IDB, IMF,
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and International Labor Organization
(ILO). Colombia preferred to handle security and global matters through the international
forums provided by the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Pursuing a some
what independent course, Colombia became a respected voice in the General Assembly
and other international arenas on matters of international law.
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IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION EFFORTS
A. OBJECTIVES
The current strategy favors interdiction, as opposed to dealing with demand-side
issues. Approximately 3/4 of all US Federal funding for anti-drug activity is spent on
interdiction. This policy is intended to reduce supply and increase the risk (cost) posed to
the supplier, both of which actions are assumed to have the effect of increasing the price
of illicit substances and, in accordance with the law of supply and demand, decrease
quantity demanded and, in turn, consumption. The intended effect of interdiction is
illustrated in Figure 1 1
.
The supply curve is said to be upward sloping because of the increased risk (cost)
to drug producers and traffickers as the quantity supplied increases. Notice that an
implication of the reduction insupply from interdiction activities is that the price of drugs
rises. Later, the possibility that there might also be drug producer initiated changes in
both supply and demand is discussed.
There are a variety of statistics which are available for evaluating the level of
cocaine activity and the effectiveness of interdiction efforts. In the case of all of the most
commonly used indicators, the level of certainty of the statistic must be considered. Most
of the evaluation performed in this chapter utilizes maximum estimates of production
provided by US government agencies. While one of the estimates presented in this
79
section attempts to calculate the impact of seizures and other losses, the use of maximum
production estimates provides at least partial mitigation of the uncertainties with regard to
the extent of coca production in South America (There is every chance that even theses
maximum estimates are low). In evaluating the impact of interdiction efforts, this chapter
will consider statistics relating to seizures, production estimates, prices, and use
estimates.
Demand Supply before interdiction effort
* Interdiction Reduces Supplly
Price Price after interdiction effort
Price before interdiction effort
Quantity
Figure 11. Intended Effect of Interdiction on Quantitiy and Price.
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B. ESTIMATING QUANTITY
1. The Maximum Estimate
Because production, transportation, and distribution activities are all illegal,
direct production estimates are nearly impossible, but indirect estimates based upon data
which is available can provide some insight into the level of Colombian participation in
the cocaine trade.
The relevant statistics from the point of view of this work are in the efforts of the
NNICC to calculate the volume and value of the imported cocaine to the USA, based
upon quantities of product available and prevailing prices each year. Drug production
can be identified with hard data, such as aerial photographs showing land being
cultivated, seizure statistics, and wholesale and retail prices. The NNICC maximum
estimates of total production over the period 1980-1988 were obtained by multiplying the
number of cultivated hectares which are detected in the producer countries (Bolivia, Peru,
Colombia and Ecuador) and applying the coefficient of productivity to obtain the quantity
of leaf available for processing. The resulting figures for production are then multiplied
by processing coefficients to determine the maximum quantities available for export to
the US. Under the NNICC methodology, different producer countries have different
yields of coca leaf per hectare of cultivation, as follows: Peru -- 1:1; Bolivia - 1:1.4;
Colombia -- 1:0.8. All processing involves the transformation of leaf to cocaine with a
coefficient of 500: 1 . That is, it takes 500 kilograms of leaf to eventually yield 1 kilogram
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of cocaine. Table VI shows the results obtained by the NNICC for the maximum
production of cocaine over the years 1981-1988.
TABLE VI MAXIMUM NNICC ESTIMATES FOR COCAINE PRODUCTION,
1981-1989.
Country Area Leaf Cocaine Percent
(hectares) (metric tons) (kg)
Peru 20,000 50,000 100.0 48.9%
1981 Bolivia 35,000 49,000 98.0 47.9%
Colombia 4,000 3.200 6.4 3.1%
Total 89,000 102,200 204.4 100.0%
Peru 50,000 50,000 100.0 46.0%
1982 Bolivia 35,000 49,000 98.0 45.1%
Colombia 12,000 9,600 19.2 8.8%
Total 97,000 108,600 217.2 100.0%
Peril 60,000 60,000 120.0 46.3%
1983 Bolivia 40,000 56,000 112.0 43.2%
Colombia 17,000 13,600 27.2 10.5%
Total 117,000 129,600 259.2 100.0%
Peril 70,000 70,000 140.0 55.6%
1984 Bolivia 30,250 42,356 84.7 33.6%
Colombia 17,000 13,600 27.2 10.8%
Total 147,254 125,956 251.9 100.0%
Peril 100,000 100,000 200.0 62.4%
1985 Bolivia 34,250 47,950 95.9 29.9%
Colombia 15,500 12,400 24.8 7.7%
Total 149,950 160,350 320.7 100.0%
Peru 120,000 120,000 240.0 63.1%
Bolivia 38,000 53,200 106.4 28.0%
1986 Ecuador 2,000 3,300 6.6 1 .7%
Colombia 17,000 13,600 27.2 7.2%
Total 175,000 190,100 380.2 100.0%
Peril 121,000 121.000 242.0 57.9%
Bolivia 48,000 67,200 134.4 32.1%
1987 Ecuador 25,000 20,000 40.0 9.6%
Colombia 510 842 1.7 0.4%
Total 194,510 209,042 418.1 100.0%
Peril 124,000 124,000 248.0 54.7%
Bolivia 56,000 78,400 156.8 34.6%
1988 Ecuador 30,000 24,000 48.0 10.6%
Colombia 300 495 1.0 0.2%
Total 210,300 226,895 453.8 100.0%
Source: NNICC Report -- ' 981-1988.
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Production increased from 204 metric tons in 1981 to 453.8 metric tons in 1988, an
increase of over 122%. Only in 1984 was there a decrease in the annual level of
maximum cocaine production, as determined by areas in production. The Colombian
share of production moves to a maximum (1988) of 10.58% over the period. Figure 12
shows these maximum yearly estimates.
Metric Tons of Cocaine
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Year
Figure12. NNICC Maximum Estimates for Cocaine Production, 1981-1988.
On one hand, these maximum estimates do not consider losses incurred in the
fields, internal consumption, and Colombian and US seizures. On the other hand, these
estimates are obtained primary through the use of satellite surveillance, which is neither
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comprehensive nor flawless, and the estimates do not consider production which may
have relocated from Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador into areas of Venezuela and
Brazil, as mentioned in Chapter II. One could therefore make the argument that these
maximum estimates are too high for consideration, because they do not consider losses,
or that the estimates are too low, because they do not adequately reflect the true area of
production. In either case, one would have a defensible position.
2. Eradication
Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police figures for eradicated hectares over the period
1981-1992 are listed in Table VII and graphed in Figure 13. The numbers show great
variance in certain years, usually when a major anti-drug effort was under way. The
lowest year, 1988, saw 230 coca producing hectares destroyed, while for the year with the
highest figure, 1983, the figure approached 6,000 hectares.
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Figure 13. Eradicated Coca-Producing Hectares in Colombia.
3. Seizures
a. Paste in Colombia
The amount of coca paste seized by Colombian authorities over the period
1984-1992 is shown in Table VIII. The values fluctuate between the 1984 amount of
9,448 kg and the 1992 figure of 6,053. The years 1987, 1989, and 1991 all reflect a
substantial increase, but the overall effect from 1984 to 1992 is a net decrease of 36%.
This trend is illustrated in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Coca Paste Seizures in Colombia, 1984-1992 (1 metric ton=1,000 kilograms).
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b. Colombian Laboratory Destruction
From 1981 to 1992, the number of cocaine-producing laboratories destroyed
by Colombian authorities rose from 3 1 to 224, as shown in Table IX, with a maximum
number of 1,359 in 1987. In other words, the net change from 1981 to 1992 is on the
order of 623%. It is difficult to quantify these seizures in terms of product, however. No
information is available on the productive capacity of the labs, nor are there reliable
indications of the total number of laboratories in operation over the period. The trend in
laboratory destruction is illustrated in Figure 15.
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Figure 15. Colombian Laboratories Destroyed, 1981-1992.
c. Cocaine in Colombia
From 1982 to 1992, over 230,000 kilograms of cocaine were seized in
Colombia. This represents a net increase over the period of over 8,500%. These figures
are reflected in Table X and Figure 16.
Significant years are 1984, during which there occured a substantial
anti-cocaine campaign, and the period over the late 1980s and early 1990s, which
witnessed the bitter struggle between the government authorities and the Medellin cartel.
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Figure 16. Colombian Cocaine Seizures, 1981-1992.
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cL Cocaine Enroute to the US
Table XI lists amounts of cocaine seized by the US Customs Service and the
US Coast Guard from 1981-1986. The National Drug Enforcement Policy Board figures
from this table illustrate a 1500% net increase in the quantity of drugs seized from 1981
to 1986 (Figure 17). The reader is advised, however, that these figures may reflect some
"double-counting" which has consistently occured in this area, meaning that the figures
may be higher than the actual seizures they were intended to record. 66 More recently, the
US Customs Service recorded 55,000 pounds of cocaine seized in the first quarter of the
1992 fiscal year. 67 That would be 24.97 metric ton;., a substantial increase over the latest
reported figure below, but saying that this was an indication of success would be
stretching the evidence. An increase in seizures in the context of a larger quantity
shipped would yield a net increase in imports.
TABLE XI. QUANTITY OF COCAINE SEIZED BY US CUSTOMS AND US COAST GUARD
1981-1986







Source: National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, 1986-1987
Reuter, P., Crawford, C, Cave, J., Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military
Participation in Drug Interdiction, Rand Corporation, R-3594-USDP, January, 1988.
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Robinson, L, Witkin, C, "Cracks in the Drug War," US News and World Report, March 2,
1992, v 112, n8.
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Figure 17. Seizures of Cocaine by US Customs and Coast Guard.
4. World-Wide Cocaine Seizures
The United Nations has monitored narcotics seizures world-wide, as reported by
its member nations. These statistics are listed in Table XII and reflect a steady increase
in the amount seized, a trend illustrated in Figure 18. One of the reasons that these
figures are so interesting is that the US has tied more of its foreign policy, including trade
and economic aid, to cooperation in the anti-drug effort.
91

















Source: United Nations, Data on the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
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Figure 18. World-Wide Cocaine Seizures, 1947-1985.
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§. Estimates of Colombian Exports, Considering Losses
A more interesting exercise is to make an estimate which considers losses in
cultivation and production, internal consumption of intermediate and final products,
confiscation of product and eradication of cultivation areas. Arneta, et. al., present a
model of minimum and maximum availability of cocaine for importation into the US
from Colombia. 68
This minimal estimate considers Colombian production with historical
importation figures from NNICC reports, while the maximal estimate considers imports
of base from other producer countries in the range of 40 to 50% of their total production.
From the total number of hectares in production, the number of hectares
eradicated by national authorities is subtracted, and then multiplied by a factor of 0.8 to
obtain actual hectares in production. From this result a factor of 5% is subtracted to
reflect internal consumption of leaf, leaving an amount of leaf available for conversion.
A conversion factor of leaf to base of 200: 1 is assumed, and confiscation and internal
consumption amounts are subtracted. The amount of imported of base is added to obtain
the amount of base available to process. Applying a conversion factor from base to
cocaine and considering the amounts confiscated and/or consumed, the amount of cocaine
available for export is determined. The final step is to multiply the amount of product
available by the prevailing wholesale price.
Arrieta, Carlos, C, Orjuela, Luis J., et. al., Narcotrafico en Colombia: Dimensiones
Politicas, Economicas, Jurfdicas e Internacionales, Universidad de los Andes, 1993.
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The minimum estimates listed in Table XIII fluctuate from a low of $.7 billion
(1984) to a high of $2.7 billion (1982). The estimate for the latest year, 1988, is $1.2
million. Although there were sharp changes of direction over the years 1982-1985, the
net change for the period is a decrease of 14.3%.
Table XIII. Minimum Value of Cocaine Exports -- 1981-1988.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Hectares Total 3,500 8,500 16,000 17,000 15,500 17,000 22,500 27,000
Cultivated Eradicated 362 2,316 5,834 4,930 1,333 869 571 230
Producing 3,138 6,184 10,166 12,070 14,167 16,131 21,929 26,770
Leaf
Available
Total 2,510 4,947 8,133 9,656 12,183 12,905 17,543 21,416
Losses 126 247 406 438 609 645 877 1,071
Harvested 2,385 4,700 7,723 9,218 11,574 12,260 16,666 20,345
Confiscated 1 2 42 152 163 188 97
Consumed 400 400 400 400 500 500 500 500
Processed 1,983 4,299 7,327 8,777 10,922 11,597 15,978 19,781
Base Total 10 22 37 44 55 58 80 99
Available Consumed
Confiscated 10 4 4 7 4
Imported 57 100 100 100 80 70 90 90
Processed 67 122 137 134 131 124 163 185
Cocaine Total 27 49 55 54 52 50 65 74
Available Consumed 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Confiscated 1 1 4 34 4 3 8 19
Exported 23 45 48 16 45 44 54 52
Sales thousands 60 60 50 45 40 34 26 23
Price U.S. per kg
Total billions $ 1.4 2.7 2.4 .7 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.2
Value
Source: Narcotics Trafficking in Colombia (Uniandes, 1990)
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The maximum estimates in Table XIV show that cocaine exports reached a
maximum value of $4.5 billion in 1983, and from that point on had a decreasing
tendency. In the present decade, the value of exports of cocaine from Colombia
fluctuates between $1.5 billion and $4.0 billion. The estimate for the latest year ( 1 988) is
$3.3 billion. As with the minimum estimates, the direction of the trend is sharply varied
from 1982-1985, but the net change over the entire period is a decrease of 19.5%.
Table XIV. Maximum Value of Cocaine E
with Increased Importation from othe
xports 1981-1988,
r Producers.
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Hectares Total 3,500 8,500 16,000 17,000 15,500 17,000 22,500 27,000
Cultivated Eradicated 362 2,316 5,834 4,930 1,333 869 571 230
Producing 3,138 6,184 10,166 12,070 14,167 16,131 21,929 26,770
Leaf Total 2,510 4,947 8,133 9,656 12,183 12,905 17,543 21,416
Available Losses 126 247 406 438 609 645 877 1,071
Harvested 2,385 4,700 7,723 9,218 11,574 12,260 16,666 20,345
Confiscated 1 2 42 152 163 188 97
Consumed 400 400 400 400 500 500 500 500
Processed 1,983 4,299 7,327 8,777 10,922 11,597 15,978 19,781
Base Total 99 22 37 44 55 58 80 99
Available Consumed
Confiscated 10 4 4 7 4
Imported 168 168 207 193 226 264 301 325
Processed 178 190 243 237 281 322 381 423
Cocaine Total 712 76 97 94 112 129 152 169
Available Consumed 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Confiscated 1 1 4 34 4 3 8 19





60 60 50 45 40 34 26 23
Total
Value
billions $ 4.1 4.3 4.5 2.6 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.3
Source: Narcotics Trafficking in <Colombia (Uniandes, 1990).
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Figure 19 illustrates the trends reported by the NNICC maximum estimates and
the Arrieta minimum and maximum estimates over the period 1981-1988.
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Figure 19. Comparison of NNICC and Arrieta Estimates.
Although the NNICC's resulting estimates are considered to be the best
available, certain problem areas exist, such as:
The estimates over the quantity of that produced are on basis of aerial photographs.
The output by hectare changes between countries, regions, and over time. 69
Usually, the quantity of coca leaves produced is identified with the estimate of
leaves cultivated. There is a tendency to ignore losses produced by climate.
National Intelligence Estimate, 1981.
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infestation, the robbery and other causes, which can result in a 10% reduction in the
quantity of leaf cultivated. In relation to the internal consumption of leaf, paste and
cocaine the NNICC recognize that in producer countries do not have studies to
determine the levels of consumption
The NNICC assumes that it is necessary to have 200 Kg of leaf to obtain 1 kg of
paste and 2.5 kg of paste to obtain 1 kg of cocaine. That means a factor of global
conversion of 500: 1, this coefficient has not changed over the period in which
these studies have been conducted, and therefore fails to reflect any advances in
processing technology or other factor.
C. INFORMATION ON PRICE
Table XV relates the average annual price of cocaine over the period 1980-1988.
These US General Accounting Office figures show a 63% decrease in the average
wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine over the period. This progression is illustrated
in Figure 20.
The price per kilo for cocaine in Miami went from between $13,500 and 516,000 in
late 1989 to between $18,000 and $27,000 in 1990. By early 1992, however, the price
had fallen back to between $14,000 and $22,000 per kilo. Interestingly, the spike in
prices occured during some of the most intense periods of the Medillin drug wars, a
period of intense competition between the cartels of Medllin and Cali.
Robinson, L, Witkin, C, "Cracks in the Drug War," US News and World Report, March 2,
1992, v 112, n8.
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Table XV. Average Wholesale Price of Cocaine, 1980-1988.
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Figure 21 compares U.S. expenditures on interdiction with maximum estimates
of production of cocaine from leaf produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru combined. It
is apparent from this figure that, as the interdiction investment rose from approximately
SI. 5 billion in 1981 to almost S3 billion in 1987. so the level of cocaine production rose
(from approximately 60 metric tons to over 200 metric tons over the same period). This
would seem to indicate that, whatever the effect of seizures on price and consumption,
they do not lead to a drop in production rates.
Billions US$ Metric Tons Cocaine
Budget Cocaine
0.5 L J 150
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Year
Figure 21. US Interdiction Budget versus Cocaine Production.
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Figure 22 illustrates recorded U.S. seizures and total production in producer
countries. From 1981 to 1986, there was an increase in the seized metric tonnage from
approximately 2,000 to approximately 27,000. As with the size of the interdiction
budget, these statistics on seizures coincide with those illustrating the increase in coca
leaf production. It can therefore be said that the effect of increasing seizures has not
resulted in a reduction in deliveries of cocaine to the distribution/consumption system.
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Figure 22. Cocaine Production versus US Seizures.
Figure 23 compares Colombian expenditures on narcotics enforcement with
production in that country over the period 1982-1987. Over the period 1982-1984,
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defense budget expenditures and coca leaf production are practically identical in
direction. From 1984 to 1986, the size of the defense budget and the level of coca leaf
production move inversely to one another; the defense budget goes down and the level of
production rises. From 1986 to 1987, however, the defense budget increases slightly
while coca leaf production experiences a dramatic surge. All anti-narcotic activity is
funded through the defense budget, and one might conclude that changes in funding will
not produce corresponding changes in results (at least in terms of coca leaf production).
However, the situation in Colombia is complicated in the extreme by the presence of
guerrilla activity. Not only might the majority of funding fluctuations be explained by
anti-insurgency activity, but the level of involvement of insurgents in narcotics activity
can sometimes make it difficult to tell what funds are really fighting narcotics and what
funds are strictly limited to anti-guerrilla efforts. Nonetheless, one thing is clear: the
organizations tasked with the fighting narcotics activity cannot claim changes in coca leaf
production as a result of increases or decreased funding.
Figure 24 shows the average yearly price in comparison to U.S. expenditures on
interdiction. The illustration of the gradual increase in expenditures from 1981 to 1986 is
in contrast to the steady decline in price. The sharp increase in expenditures from 1986 to
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Figure 24. US Interdiction Budget versus Price.
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Another factor for consideration is that high seizure rates do not necessarily
reflect positively on interdiction and negatively on the cartels. For instance, it is believed
that responding to the rapid growth of the European market may have led to the risks
taken by the cartel and the mafia which exposed them to the "Green Ice" seizures in
September of 1992. "'
Another negative element to the cost effectiveness of the interdiction effort is
that poor coordination is often exhibited. For instance, after giving the Bolivian military
S14 million to train two battalions of troops for anti-drug operations, the US had to rent
four wheel drive vehicles at the last minute in order to transport the troops to the
operation site. :
In further examining the cost effectiveness of interdiction, another set of
comparisons is possible. First, as demonstrated in Figure 25, the drug revenue per
cultivated hectare which is available to the cartels is apparently decreasing. This
estimated revenue is based upon the falling wholesale US price of refinement and the
increasing number of hectares in cultivation.
Next, as demonstrated in Figure 26, it is possible to interpret the US cost of
interdiction in terms of the amount of seizures by calculating a per-kilogram interdiction
expense. As seen in the figure, the cost is steadily decreasing.
Witkin, Cordon "Cocaine Kings and Mafia Dons," US News and World Report, October 1 9,
1992, vl13, n15.
Robinson, L, Witkin, C, "Cracks in the Drug War," US News and World Report, March 2,
1992, v 112, n8.
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Figure 25. Potential Revenue per Hectare (Using Wholesale Price).
US dollars per kilogram


















Figure 26. US Interdiction Cost per Kilogram Seized.
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Looking at the US cost of interdiction in terms of the number of hectares in
cultivation, however, reveals an interesting trend. As shown in Figure 27. the cost of
interdiction per hectare in cultivation is increasing. This is made even more dramatic
when one considers that the 1992 drug control budget had risen to three times that of the
last comparison year used here.
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Figure 27. US Interdiction Cost per Cultivated Hectare.
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2. Objectives Involving Demand and Supply
Once again, the objective of the interdiction effort is to reduce supply, thereby
increasing price and reducing consumption. From the information presented in previous
sections, it is possible to draw two fundamental conclusions about the cocaine market:
The price of cocaine has steadily decreased, with only a few exceptions, since 1980
The supply of cocaine has steadily grown since 1980
In the sense that these results are completely contrary to the stated objectives of
interdiction, it can be said at this point that the efforts have failed. It is interesting,
however, to continue the supply and demand evaluation in order to obtain a better
understanding of why it is so difficult to approach the cocaine market using the law of
supply and demand.
a. Supply Increases
It is widely accepted that interdiction has had little impact on the supply of
cocaine, which is in fact increasing. 73 This can be logically interpreted from the rapidly
rising production rates, falling prices, growing but still inconsequential seizure rates, and
great uncertainties which characterize the cocaine market.












Figure 28. Supply and Demand Curves Showing Effect of Increased Supply.
b. Possible Explanations
In the case of illicit products and substances, there are several characteristics
of the demand and supply equation that can be observed. One must first recognize the
limited ability of determining supply and demand indicators in an illicit market. Having
accepted that, however, it is possible to draw several conclusions about the nature of the
cocaine problem as seen in the context of supply and demand.
An important aspect of supply and demand analysis is its capacity to offer
indications of the likely outcome of continued interdiction efforts. Viewing the supply
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and demand graph in this way, it is possible to say several things about the nature of its
elements.
The price indicator seems to be in the firm control of the cartels. This is not
to say that price is not influenced by interdiction efforts. It is likely that interdiction
serves to increase the price of cocaine, but that increase is of great use to the cartels in
maintaining both profit margins and market control. 4 The threat of incarceration by the
authorities serves to deter individuals from entering the trade. The cartels, however,
combine extensive resources to offer their employees and affiliates increased chances of
success. By increasing their management efforts to make operations more efficient, by
relocating to more cost effective areas of production, and by developing more
cost-effective production and distribution systems and practices, the cartels can give
themselves a large amount of room to offer price incentives to new markets. The fact that
the cartels are involved in such a wide variety of enterprises (products and serices, legal
and otherwise); gives them further room in which to operate, because they can suffer
losses in one enterprise which are offset by profits in another. In fact, losses are at
sometimes crucial to the cartels because they are utilized in money laundering operations.
The Economist1 * noted the following characterists in one of its many
examinations of supply and demand in the cocaine trade:
Suppliers maintain large stocks, all down the chain of distribution, ready to be
drawn upon if supply is disrupted
"High in the Andes: Drugs War," The Economist, February 1 3, 1993, v326, n7798.
"High in the Andes: Drugs War," The Economist, February 13, 1993, v326, n7798.
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The US GAO claims that drug profits are so high that the cartels are well insulated
against occasional losses
It is believed that, while agencies in Bolivia were wiping out hectares of coca, the
growers developed techniques which allowed them to double the per hectare yield
Supply and demand exist at every stage in the chain from grower to consumer
America's retail cocaine market may be worth anything from S30 billion to SI 50
billion per year
With regard to quantity, there is every indication that the cartel's ability to
produce cocaine exceeds the ability of interdiction agencies to seize it. The most that can
be said for interdiction in terms of its inflence quantity is that the total amount of supply
is, arguably, less than it would have been otherwise. At the other extreme, it is equally
possible that the cartels currently sacrifice a given percentage of supply in order to
maintain price. Such a mechanism might also provide a convenient opportunity to
impose organizational discipline.
The factors influencing the actual curves of supply and demand are myriad in
the case of any product, but even more complex with an illicit substance. Specifically,
the addictive properties of cocaine present a problem in determining demand's capacity
for change. It is impossible to know the precise effect, but it can certainly be assumed
that an addict will have a far higher price threshold than a typcial consumer of a
non-addictive good. In recent years, the price of cigarettes in the US has increased
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dramatically, yet there are still demographic groups in which the number of users has
increased in spite of the price.
Because of the limited impact of interdiction on supply, the most effective
course of action open to the US may be to reduce demand through associated costs to the
consumer, rather than by trying to increase price. Such costs include the possibility of
prison time, fines, loss of social status, etc.. The problem with the US demand side of the
equation is that the only way to ensure such cost is to increse the apparatus that finds,
prosecutes, and punishes drug consumers. The cost of doing this effectively may be the
erosion of civil liberties, and that is a cost that the US is probably not willing to bear.
Another problem with such a strategy is that every seizure or arrest action at the
consumer level affects the minimum number of participants and resources (product, cash,
etc.) available in the supply chain. In other words, it requires more effort to remove
cocaine from consumption in 1 gram units at the consumer level than it does in kilogram
units farther up the distribution chain. Even if the US were willing to engage in security
practices to ensure the identification and punishment of consumers, the resources required
to prosecute such a plan would probably cause even its staunchest supporters to rethink
the approach.
Figure 29 is an illustration whose original source for prices and quantities
was obtained through interviewing participants.
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Total Value of Original Shipment Participant Units and Prices
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Figure 29. Price and Quantity, from Producer to Consumer. 7
The progression from farmer to end-user affects the actual impact on
consumption. To definitively decrease the number of drug users at a given point in time,
the only certain way to interdict the drug is between the individual user and his
immediate supplier. Unfortunately, eliminating supply to the end user places extreme
demands upon law enforcement, demands which may, in fact, be insurmountable.
Seizures of cocaine or precursor products are likely to affect more end-users only if those
Rensselaer, L.W., The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power, Transaction
Publishers, 1990.
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supplies cannot be replaced. The seizure of 1 kilogram of cocaine at a production point,
for instance, will become so diluted by the time that the supply chain reaches the end user
that there will be no noticeable effect.
Figure 30 illustrates one important consideration when dealing with the law
of supply and demand and the cocaine market. For any given change in quantity or price,
there is a possible combination of shifts in the supply and demand curves. Normally, a
supply and demand analysis might not have to confront that issue directly, as the market
conditions can be relatively well determined. The number of cans of beans sold in a
given year, for example, is a statistic which can be held to be reliable. When dealing with
an illicit substance such as cocaine, however, such fundamental indicators are unavailable
and. when estimated, the resulting figures are vulnerable to challenges from advocates for
any specific policy direction. In the case presented in the figure, a drop in price can be
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Figure30. Range of Shifts in Supply and Demand Curves, Given a Decrease in Price.
The argument can be made that the price might drop even further, with a
corresponding increase in use, if it were not for interdiction efforts. Unfortunately, it is
altogether probable that, if interdiction were stopped immediately, the cartels would
decrease production to maintain price. The jusification that things would be worse if not
for interdiction does not, therefore, appear to be sound.
3. Indications of Consumption
There are several sources for information regarding the consumption of cocaine
in the US. During the hearings of the US House of Representatives Select Committee on
Narcotics Abuse and Prevention in October of 1990, the Committee was presented with a
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graph showing the results of three studies: The National Institute on Drug Abuse's
Household Survey, the annual High School Senior Survey, and a study of the Partnership
for a Drug-Free America. This graph is reproduced in Figure 3 1
.
NIDA HS Seniors Partnership Study
% Using Cocaine during the past year
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Year
Figure 31. Three Study Comparison of Cocaine Usage.
Source: US House of Representatives Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse.
These studies report a decrease in cocaine use among those surveyed over the
respective periods measured. This alleged reduction in consumption is sometimes used
as an additional defense for the interdiction strategy. Even if supply is increasing, reason
interdiction advocates, the drastic drop in price can only be explained if one takes
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decreasing demand into consideration, and this is logically explained by the effects of the
non-monetary increase in the cost of purchasing/using drugs. There are two problems
with this line of thinking.
First, the "studies" reported above are more accurately characterized as surveys,
for that is what they actually are. One of the more interesting areas of the demand-side
interdiction efforts is not dealt with in this thesis, but is mentioned here in reference to
these surveys. Since the early 1980's, the US has been engaged in a massive publicity
campaign, oriented toward young people but exposed to the entire population, which
promotes the idea that one should "Just Say No" and that "Losers Use Drugs." The
NIDA surveys households and tracks usage among 18-34 year olds. The High School
Senior survey is performed at secondary schools, as is the Partnership for a Drug-Free
America's study. One could argue that the only trend reported in the above chart is in
regard to the popularity of drug use, rather than the use itself.
More recently, another National Institute on Drug Abuse Annual Household survey
shows illicit drug use has leveled off from the previously reported trend, and cocaine
abuse is actually increasing. Between 1988 and 1991, the number of weekly cocaine
users rose nearly a third, with the sharpest rises among people over 35."
Second, there is evidence from another source which says the opposite about
cocaine use. One historical indicator of drug abuse involves tracking reports of health
emergencies recorded by hospitals. It stands to reason that a reduction in drug use will
coincide with a reduction in such reports, and vice versa. In spite of the alleged reduction
"The War on Drugs," US News and World Report, December 30, 1991, vl 1 1, n27.
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in drug abuse, however, the number of cocaine-related hospital emergencies has increased
over the period of anti-drug efforts (see Table XVI). Over the period 1980-1986, the
number of cocaine-related hospital emergencies in the U.S. rose from 4.200 to 13.800.
These U.S. General Accounting Office figures represent a net increase in such
emergencies of 229% over the period.
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Figure 32. Cocaine Related Hospital Emergencies in the US 1980-1986.
The Drug Abuse Warning Network, whcih measures drug related emergency room
cases, reports cocaine-caused emergencies jumped 31% from the fall of 1990 to the
spring of 1991, while heroin episodes increased 26%.
"
8 Cocaine-induced deaths in Dade
County, Florida, averaged 4.2 per month in the first nine months of 1991, compared with
1.7 per month in 1990. 7q
ibid.
Robinson, L, Witkin, C, "Cracks in the Drug War," US News and World Report, March 2,
1992, v 112, n8.
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4. Summary
It may be useful to reiterate the main points made in this section. From the
trends reported in production and seizures, it is possible to report a net increase in the
supply of cocaine. In accordance with the law of supply and demand, it is reasonable to
anticipate a corresponding drop in price, which is, indeed, observed. At this point in the
discussion, however, some would argue that a price drop of the magnitude witnessed can
only be explained by the impact of a corresponding decrease in demand. There are
supporting surveys available to support sue:, a claim, but this evidence is countered with
the trend in cocaine-related hospital emergencies.
E. INCREASED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
1. Costs
Military operations of any kind are costly. The financial burden to a country
whose military is utilized against criminal activity goes beyond the actual cost of
operations, however. It is also necessary to consider the fact that total resources will have
to be increased if a military is to take on responsibilities related to law enforcement and
still maintain an adequate level of preparation for its original mission.
There is also a human cost. Not only does military involvement expose
personnel to risk of death or injury, but the fact that the military is involved may lead to
an escalation in violence. This is an obvious consequence; criminals who arm themselves
with pistols against police officers are certain to arm themselves with greater weaponry
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against soldiers with machine guns, cannon, and helicopter gunships, provided they have
adequate financial resources.
Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney once characterized narcotics as a "threat
to the sovereignty and security of the United States."
80 At the same time, he directed
commanders to develop planning to increase the role of the US military in Latin
American drug-producing countries. While no one anticipates the US embarking on a
unilateral effort in another nation, it is still ironic to note that the Mr. Cheney's action
plan to defend the sovereignty of the US is itself a threat to the sovereignty of the other
nations concerned.
2. Benefits
In addition to the obvious benefits to be derived from increased numbers of
personnel and improved technology and equipment for operations, the value of the
military intelligence system must be taken into account. National security interests bond
the military very tightly with a country's intelligence gathering organizations. Moreover,
the military will already be well-versed in intelligence operations, and will know better
how to manage intelligence than civilian law enforcement, which is generally
unaccustomed to such information and procedures.
It may be that a military organization will always outperform its civilian law
enforcement counterparts due to the greater resources which are available to it and to the
increased level of training to be found in military, as opposed to civilian, organizations.




The argument has been advanced that U.S. military involvement would have
a counter productive effect on the situation. Essentially, this point of view suggests that
the dogmatic approach inherent in military organizations is effective in eliminating only
inexperienced smugglers. 81 The consequence of this is that experienced smugglers
benefit from reduced competition and increased prices.
b. Colombia
The risk of increased involvement of the Colombian military in anti-narcotics
activity is more severe in consequence and immediate in impact than in the case of the
U.S.. Major involvement of the Colombian armed forces in anti-narcotics activity
threatens to expose the military ranks to the corruption that has plagued its justice system.
More important than the ineffectiveness of military operations against narcotics
traffickers that would exist given the potential for bribery, intimidation, etc., is the chance
that these problems would not be limited to the area of narcotics, but would spread
throughout the levels of the Colombian armed forces, posing a serious threat to the
security of the nation.
When considered in combination with the insurgent problems found in many
producer nations, the potential consequences are even more alarming. It may be that
pushing the military of a producer country into efforts directed against narcotics
Reuter, P., Crawford ]., and Cave, J., Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military
Participation in Drug Interdiction, Rand Publication R-3594 USDP, 1988.
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syndicates will drive those groups and individuals into closer relationships with insurgent
groups. This is an attractive proposition for both the syndicates (who are in need of
"soldiers") and the insurgent groups (who are generally cash poor).
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It would be. at best, unrealistic to expect that a single research effort at the
conclusion of a course of study could compare to the vast resources which have been
compiled concerning the problem of drug trafficking. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this
work will, in some small way, focus attention on aspects of the problem which seem to
have become remote from the formulation of official policy.
While the argument has been made before, it is still necessary to stress that the
objectives of the "War on Drugs" are not being met. This is evidenced by observing two
simple facts: The amount of money being spent in the interdiction effort continues to
grow larger each year; yet the average annual price of one kilogram of cocaine continues
to decline - a direct contradiction to the primary goal of the interdiction effort, which is
to reduce supply and consumption by increasing hazards (and the resulting price of
product) faced by smugglers engaged in narcotics activity. Similarly, the incidence of
cocaine-related hospital emergencies, and cocaine-related violence and criminal activity
in general, continues to be on the rise. The conclusion, therefore, seems rather simple
and direct: The War on Drugs is not being won.
There are several topics worthy of further research that have emerged during the
course of this work:
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How can one explain the anamoly between survey reports showing a decline in
consumption and cocaine-related hospital emergency statistics demonstrating the
opposite?
What are the realities of applying the law of supply and demand and other common
economic tools when dealing with an illicit market
What are the actual monetary costs and benefits of interdiction, versus other,
demand-oriented, drug control strategies?82
What has changed in the strategy for the War on Drugs since the beginning of the
Clinton Administration?
Can healthcare reform play a role in the War on Drugs?
What are the most current and accurate estimates of areas of drug production
(world-wide)?
What are the prospects for crop substitution and other programs which seek to
increase the original producer's (farmer's) incentive to not participate in the illicit
market?
One should also consider the increasing tendency of political regimes to place the
added burden of drug enforcement upon military organizations. First, such activity is not
within the original mandate or training and organization of these units, and, as discussed
in Chapter IV, the risks posed by continuing this trend toward military involvement are
far too great to allow it to continue without a major rethinking of the goals and
The reader is urged to consult the Budget Summary of the President' s Drug Control Policy,
which lists three years worth of budget expeditures, estimates and proposals, along with brief
descriptions of the activity associated with each line item.
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operational principles which are to be employed. These risks can be summarized in two
primary points. First, as mentioned in Chapter IV, increased military involvement in the
zero tolerance approach to interdiction efforts will emphasize the lack of randomness
involved in those efforts. The result is that the inexperienced smuggler, who carries
smaller shipments, is the recipient of the increased attention. The more experienced
smuggler, who is wise to the ways of anti-narcotics efforts, is rarely affected. Indeed, the
experienced smuggler is grateful in such a circumstance, for the ultimate effect is to drive
prices up and keep out competition. It is interesting to note that, while the law of supply
and demand is being debated among bureacrats and politicians, the cartels would be able
to more effectively utilize patterned interdiction efforts as a factor in their own
position-enhancing strategies. The second great risk of military involvement lies in
exposing military personnel to the corruption which is widespread in the activity. While
it may be comfortable for some to assume that this is primarily a danger to Colombia, the
fact of the matter is that the money responsible for such corruption knows no national or
cultural bounds.
It should be obvious that the Colombian government and military and security
forces are going to great lengths to fight the activity of narcotics traffickers. Those who
advance the argument that Colombia is not as concerned with drug activity as it should be
(because it is viewed as a problem of the U.S.) need only review the negative impacts,
social, economic, judicial, and political, which are a direct result of the ongoing activity
to know that Colombia must address the problem in some way.
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At the same time, one should consider that drugs and drug-related violence are not
the only threats to Colombian society. There is an ongoing, and quite serious, insurgent
problem: poverty is widespread, along with its partners in misery - violence,
delinquency, illiteracy, etc.; and the level of corruption, which is now at a point of being
an issue altogether separate from its origins in narcotics, has become a serious question in
regard to Colombia's future as a democratic nation.
A view held by many in Colombia was expressed by Luis Canon, editor of El Pais:
"We are tired of being told by Washington how to run our drugs policy. With enromous
sacrifices we smashed the Medellin cartel. Do we see the United States doing anything
about consumption?" 83 As anti-narcotics efforts turn away from the violent and much
feared Medillin cartel to the operation based in Call, which is very well organized and
even respected among parts of the population, maintaining popular support for an
anti-drug offensive will be difficult.
The threat posed by the Colombian insurgents cannot be under-emphasized. The
politician who advocates taking a "harder line" with narcotics supplying countries should
remember one important fact: The insurgent has as his primary goal the overthrow of the
government, while a narcotics trafficker's ultimate desire is to be left alone so that he can
continue to amass his fortune. If the leadership of a country has a finite amount of
resources which must be expended in one area or the other, it is not difficult to anticipate
their course of action.
"Call High: Colombia", The Economist, December 25, 1993, v329, n7843.
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Resources of the U.S. devoted to the Colombian end of the drug can be of most use
if directed in two areas: The operations of the Colombian Narcotics Police and the
Intelligence capability of the Colombian military. As discussed in Chapter IV, the risks
of pushing the Colombian military into a direct anti-narcotics role by far outweigh the
possible benefits.
Additionally, the U.S. should reconsider the entire strategy of interdiction. The
costs and risks faced by the necessity of military involvement in such activity might be
justified if the results proved out the soundness of the interdiction theory. While a
superior solution is not immediately apparent, a wide variety of alternatives have been
and continue to be offered from all sectors of U.S. society. History does not look kindly
upon previous similar efforts, as is evidenced by occurrences ranging from the
prohibition era to more recent attempts to seal the borders to illegal immigrants.
As with so many other things at this point in time, the major obstacle to progress
can be found in one issue: money. The financial resources available to the small number
of people who control the Colombian narcotics industry are so vast as to seem without
limit. While it may seem comical to some, a serious consideration of the Colombian
people must be the ability of the narcotics traffickers to compete in an escalating arms
race with the Colombian authorities. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the cash poor
state in which it and its satellite countries have been left give reason for further concern.
It is doubtful that there exists a weapons system in the world that the cocaine syndicates
could not afford.
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In the end, the people of the United States and of Colombia must examine their
interests in the issue. Only when a solution with widespread popular support is proposed
and adopted will there be any reason to anticipate progress against the drug problem.
This widespread acceptance must stretch across borders, enabling a true partnership to be
formed between the two nations to solve a problem that is damaging to both.
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